On Dec. 19, 2015, at 0913 hrs, the Keene, NH, Fire Department (KFD) was alerted about the odor of liquefied petroleum (LP) gas in a building at 90 Main St., thus starting one of the largest deployments of fire/EMS resources in recent history to the City of Keene.
Keene is one of nine regional New Hampshire state hazmat teams certified to technician level. Additionally, the KFD is a member of, and is dispatched by, the regional Southwestern New Hampshire District Fire Mutual Aid System. Based in Keene and known locally as “Mutual Aid,” they dispatch fire and EMS for 78 communities in New Hampshire, Vermont and Massachusetts.
Last month we covered the incident details; this month we’ll review lessons learned.
Incident review by Chief Goldfeder and lessons learned from Chief Mark Howard
Discipline
This incident went very well considering the potential. One factor that has emerged as needing improvement is discipline—and that isn't uncommon in the fire service. However, gone are the days when fire companies respond but don’t stage or follow predetermined polices and plans. It is incumbent upon those riding in the front seat to do exactly as directed. Further, it’s important to remember that additional companies are called in for a specific reason. Trust command to know that reason, and do exactly as expected. While we all want to be in the heart of the action, that’s not our choice. We are summoned, and therefore we must do what’s needed as ordered by command or previously determined by regional policy.
Alarm assignments
It's pretty clear based upon the outcome of this incident that the system worked—and worked well. One example is the alarm assignments. Not many departments are able to say that they have alarm assignments going up to and above a fifth alarm. This case study gives us all a great reason to develop those alarm cards now.
A CAD system that works
It’s interesting that the Southwestern New Hampshire District Fire Mutual Aid Center waited many years before going to a CAD system that would do what they wanted and needed it to do. Quite simply, their manual card system worked well for many years—so well that they were very cautious before moving to an automated system. In many areas, unfortunately, new CAD systems are purchased before the department knows if the system will conform to their needs, which is absolutely ridiculous. If a new CAD system doesn’t equal or improve the call-handling, dispatch and overall response times versus the previous manual system, then you are doing the public and the firefighters a disservice. Don't let the tail wag the dog. Fire/rescue is all about getting the right qualified personnel to an incident as quick as possible—and without delay.
Cooperative attitudes
The efforts of everyone working together and doing their assigned tasks was evident as they progressed through this deployment of more than 17 hours. The collaboration and efforts of the city staff, emergency responders, state officials and Liberty Utilities officials allowed this very serious incident to be handled as quickly as possible. For fire department personnel to conduct residential and commercial building checks with gas meters in 1,250 structures in a 10-hour period is a major accomplishment.
Financial impact
In the days after the incident, the fire department worked to confirm and complete reports for all calls for service, which is now estimated to be 120 responses related to the propane gas emergency. The estimated cost for the response totaled $100,000, which includes both city cost and mutual-aid cost for those that billed. Under allowable New Hampshire laws, invoices were prepared, and Liberty Utilities covered those costs incurred for the response to the incidents related to the propane gas emergency.
Preplanning
The department’s experience and familiarity with the Liberty Utilities Production Facility and gas distribution system comes from years of working with past and current owners. That experience and knowledge of the system was a great benefit to the command staff as they made early critical decisions that set the groundwork for the response.
What the department lacked was having a customer distribution list, as not all buildings are served, and good maps. During the incident, an application was developed by city GIS staff who will in the future allow crews using mobile data terminals (MDTs) and smartphones to access a secure link showing the distribution system and customer locations. The application also allows crews performing monitoring duties to click on a location to mark it as having been checked and all clear. The application is also being updated to become useful as an “all hazards” tool for all city structures.
Disciplined staging
Overall, the department did a poor job in staging their units. They didn’t do too bad with the first work period wave, but when the second work group and strike teams (two engine strike teams and one ALS ambulance strike team) started to come into the city, there were too many assets trying to get to headquarters for briefings. Off-site secure staging areas will be established for future events along with assigning staging officers and apparatus parking for rapid deployment. This was predictably challenging, as there were more than 60 agencies in the city at the height of the incident.
Operations
The fire officers handling operations did well in assigning crews for monitoring. They broke the city down into five districts to deploy crews. Each district had, on average, five engine companies assigned with a mutual aid chief officer and Liberty Utilities personnel.
The difficulty was some fire crews not being used to the need to rapidly deploy and execute this type of job. These company officers and chiefs were briefed by the operational staff before deployment to check structures as to the mission and scope of incident.
The department clearly identified a need for focused survey monitoring teams in the future. The regional state hazmat teams are the source of such resources. Not all mutual-aid partners responded with personnel as familiar with gas monitoring as was desired, nor were they familiar with the city gas systems, including building meters, shutoffs, etc. Some departments did not have gas meters, and some that did have the meters did not have them calibrated, were not familiar with their usage and/or didn't necessarily understand how to survey a building in an incident of this magnitude. Fire operations were handled by Keene Deputy Chief Jeff Chickering and his support staff, who provided them with rapid assistance so the job could get done.
Radio communications/dispatch
Multiple tactical channels were used to handle 120 emergency calls. Mutual-aid dispatchers assigned channels as needed; however, not all agencies followed the protocol and stayed on those channels. Some departments responded and tried to operate on their own channels, which can’t happen for many reasons, most importantly safety. A plan must be followed.
Public information officer
The department identified the need to establish a PIO earlier. Even though they did get a lot of information out to the community early, they (like most departments) didn’t do it enough. They ended up with a phone hotline for information as well as releases, but it was later in the afternoon. Note: Two media press conferences were held and four press releases were issued during the 17-hour deployment.
Incident command system
The ICS/NIMS system was used throughout the incident. The State of New Hampshire Web EOC system was also used to track request and assignments. The use of ICS/NIMS forms was limited at best.
Having adequate staff to complete these forms for planning and deployment is critical in making sure that all areas are covered. It also provides material needed to complete after-action reports. The department didn’t do well with this, even though they had adequate staff. As Chief Howard stated, “I didn’t efficiently assign such tasks.” He added that they are working to improve the ease of entry into ICS/NIMS forms and to have them loaded at all workstations in the EOC.
Documentation
Create documents to track assigned apparatus. Make the documents accessible so all groups at multiple locations—fire ops, dispatch and EOC—are able to use programs like Google Docs and Excel files.
Another option is to have CAD displays accessible at all locations in addition to the dispatch center. In the past, the department has used MDTs and magnet boards to track assets. But when you have 20 or more incidents occurring at a time, it becomes difficult to track units that are and are not assigned.
The after-action report remains in progress. Feedback from all agencies and personnel playing key roles was received, and the final report was expected to be completed by May 1.
Accountability
All officers assigned worked together to maintain accountability of all personnel. The importance of making sure that all personnel have accountability tags of some sort is critical. The KFD policy is no tags, no assignment.
Life safety fire codes
The importance of occupancies meeting the life safety fire codes was never more evident than with this incident. Those locations that had required CO detectors and had CO problems in the structures were protected and the systems worked and alarmed the occupants. Those that didn’t have CO detection were not alarmed and were potentially exposed to the “silent killer”—CO gas.
Mutual-aid responses
This five-alarm emergency—with additional special call of three strike teams—had the potential to be much more severe than it turned out to be, thanks to the efforts of the KFD and their mutual-aid partners. While Chief Howard offers a professionally critical review to ensure that we all have an opportunity to learn, there is so much that went well with the performance of the KFD and the members of the Southwestern New Hampshire District Fire Mutual Aid System. There is a lot to be very proud of, and like with almost every run, things to improve upon as well.
The incident brought in 33 engine companies, three ladder companies and 11 ambulances into the city. That alone creates problems if not prepared ahead of time; fortunately, they were prepared through their system of intricate, tri-state, single-coordination-point alarm assignments.
Generally, the issue of discipline and following policy appears in many close calls, and we once again have a chance to learn from this Keene incident. While we all want to be involved at the most “action-packed” level of any run or request, responding to fire and emergencies is not all about us; rather, it’s what's best for the people and community having the emergency.
When responding on any run and especially mutual aid, it is critical that departments send exactly what's requested, along with the qualified personnel and the right equipment, so that the needs are fulfilled. While we all want to “turn out” to respond and help, we need to keep in mind the requested needs.
I personally was involved a with a very large working house fire in a mutual-aid jurisdiction about a year or so ago. Resources were requested from numerous areas, and one particular department arrived with members who were not SCBA qualified. Their intentions were good, but they were of no use. In 2016, an engine company that turns out without SCBA-qualified personnel is not an engine company, rather a fire engine full of spectators. The same goes for all personnel riding any apparatus; every riding member must be qualified to do any job requested and use any tool that is on the rig. This isn't about not being appreciative for anyone responding or assisting, but it is about fulfilling the needs of those in command and those people who need our help. That’s the business we are in.
Our sincere thanks to Fire Chief Mark Howard, Deputy Fire Chief Jeff Chickering and all the KFD personnel, Chief Phil Tirrell of the Southwestern New Hampshire Fire Mutual Aid System, Mutual Aid Deputy Chief Tom Redin and all the officers and dispatchers for their cooperation in the development of this article. Thanks also go to all of the firefighters, fire officers and EMTs of the 33 engine companies, three ladder companies and 11 ambulances, as well as law enforcement, utilities and all others who responded or stood by as a part of this incident.
Sidebar: Fire Dispatch Center Considerations
The Southwestern New Hampshire District Fire Mutual Aid Dispatch Center was staffed by Lieutenant Jay French and Dispatcher Erik Kazlouskas. The first call for this incident started at 0913 hrs for a call of an odor of gas at 90 Main St. A second call was received a few minutes later from an Applebee’s restaurant on Key Road, with the caller reporting an odor of gas. The Applebee’s call required a Mutual Aid engine from Swanzey. These incidents started what was to be the largest response of Mutual Aid assets to an incident within the Southwestern New Hampshire District Mutual Aid System.
The following considerations are provided by Chief Phil Tirrell, chief of Mutual Aid.
Dispatcher recall plan: The dispatch center quickly realized that additional communicators were going to be needed and put out the all-call tone for off-duty personnel to report to the dispatch center. This call out also resulted in all communications chief officers responding to the dispatch center and being assigned as necessary to help mitigate the incident. Deputy Johnson was the first to arrive in the dispatch and started by assisting in call-taking and dispatching units as needed. Deputy Chief Tom Redin was the second officer to arrive, and he immediately staffed a dispatch position and assisted with call-taking and dispatching units. Lt. Matt Yeatman arrived shortly thereafter and also manned a dispatch position and started taking calls and dispatching equipment as needed. Deputy Sangermano arrived and dealt with a technical problem with one of the dispatch positions. I arrived shortly thereafter and was briefed on what had been done, what was needed and where command was setup in the city.
Operational plan: I left to meet Chief Howard at Liberty Utilities plant on Emerald Street. It was decided that the Command could be better run from the EOC. Chief Howard and I reported to the EOC in City Hall. Deputy Sangermano was requested to respond to the EOC to meet with Deputy Chickering, who had already opened the EOC. Deputy Johnson broadcasted a reverse 9-1-1 call to the residents of the Keene to advise them of the incident and the situation. Deputy Redin took charge of the dispatch center operations and decided that Lt. Yeatman and he would dispatch and deal with all the radio traffic for Keene on WQCV-921. At 11:00, Dispatcher Bailey came in and was assigned to sit at position 5.
The dispatch center game plan, in cooperation with the EOC staff, was explained to all those who responded. The dispatchers at position 3, 4 and 5 were taking phone calls and putting them into the CAD system. If the call was outside of Keene, the dispatchers at those three positions were dispatching the calls and handling operations as normal. If it was a Keene call, Deputy Chief Tom Redin was accepting and toning the call on the CAD and doing all radio traffic on 921. Lt. Yeatman was moving the apparatus on the CAD and keeping track of units in service. They created a call for 31 Vernon St. (Keene central fire station), and if apparatus went back in service, they were assigned to this call. If dispatched onto a new call, the apparatus was taken off the 31 Vernon St. call and put onto the active call. We found this worked extremely well with just two people keeping track and dispatching all calls in Keene. Deputy Chief Redin and Lt. Yeatman switched tasks throughout the day until around 1630 hrs. Deputy Johnson came back into the dispatch center and relieved people so that everyone could get a break and so everyone could eventually eat lunch. When Lt. Whipple and Dispatcher Kercewich came on duty at 1730 hrs for the night shift, they were briefed on what was going on and how we were doing things.
Multi-state resources altered: When additional help was requested from the third to the sixth alarms, Lt. French and Dispatcher Kazlouskas were instrumental in organizing and dispatching the alarm assignments on KCF-415. Around 1700 hrs, the EOC requested that a list of resources within our system be put together that could act as the second operation period. The second operation period crews would go door to door to the 1,250 customers on the gas system to monitor the atmosphere and check gas appliances. Deputy Redin started a list of who was left in our system that could supply an engine company of one officer and three firefighters with meters to come to Keene for deployment at 2100 hrs. Once the list was compiled, the EOC was notified.
Meanwhile, Chief Tirrell and Deputy Sangermano worked to notify Capital Area Fire Compact of the pending need for the New Hampshire Statewide Mobilization Plan to be implemented. Captain Ernie Petrin of the CAFC went to work putting together a strike team of engines with meters out of the CAFC and an ambulance strike team out of the Border Area Mutual Aid. Additionally, an engine strike team was requested out of the Tri-State Mutual Aid in western Massachusetts.
Incident review: There are several areas of possible improvement.
- We feel that earlier in the incident a PIO could have been established and a number be advertised for people to call in to. The Dispatch Center assigned one person to handle inquiries made to us, and directed them who should be contacted.
- We feel that it is important that the IC not grab calls as they come up on the EM mobile, but let those calls be processed as they come to the dispatch and equipment be assigned as it is available.
- It is important that the dispatch center have a good phone number to the EOC as early as possible. This allows for better communication between all the people making the decisions.
- Incoming mutual-aid units need a secure staging area. This may require closing streets and roads and assigning people to monitor those areas. Monitors need to remain at those posts to open and close access to those areas.
- All units operating at the incident need to go to an assigned radio frequency and stay there.
- The radios at the EOC need to be repaired and tested at least monthly.
- Use of the statewide H bank on all radios to allow interoperability to all responding units.
- Create an excel document that the dispatch center could keep updated and be accessed by any assigned user, such as a Google document, to track assigned apparatus at an incident.
There are several areas that went well:
- We feel that communications between dispatch and the EOC worked well once the EOC got manned and contact numbers were clear. We think that a hotline from the EOC to the dispatch would serve a very important function.
- We feel that few other dispatch centers could have handled the request for equipment and resources that we provided.
- Response by our dispatch personnel on the all call tone provided adequate staff for the event.
- We only had one call that we considered a delay in getting help, that was at McDonald’s 317 Winchester St., for subject fallen in the parking lot at 10:11 and the Troy Ambulance arrived at the scene at 10:24. We feel that with the amount of calls in the city this would be considered acceptable.
From Chief Goldfeder: These steps highlight a mutual-aid system and its dispatch center that has a plan to operate well beyond its daily capabilities and that is due to its long history and focus on fire/rescue dispatch, mutual-aid coordination and considering what best meets the needs of the agencies in the three states for which they provide services. The relationship among the KFD, its dispatch center at Southwestern Fire Mutual Aid and the member agencies is not a casual one, but rather a formal, long-term cooperative operation that has proven itself many times over. Fire communications is not an afterthought in the Keene and the southwestern New Hampshire area; it is a critical part of every time someone calls for help, and it’s the fact that the leadership of the mutual-aid system, the fire departments and the communication center understand these needs and are focused to rapidly recall needed personnel in an unusual emergency—a good point for all dispatch centers to consider.
Billy Goldfeder
BILLY GOLDFEDER, EFO, who is a Firehouse contributing editor, has been a firefighter since 1973 and a chief officer since 1982. He is deputy fire chief of the Loveland-Symmes Fire Department in Ohio, which is an ISO Class 1, CPSE and CAAS-accredited department. Goldfeder has served on numerous NFPA and International Association of Fire Chiefs (IAFC) committees. He is on the board of directors of the IAFC Safety, Health and Survival Section and the National Fallen Firefighters Foundation.
