Close Calls: Much More Than A Close Call - Part 3

On Aug. 5, 2014, there was a reported fire to which the New Carlisle Fire Department (NCFD) in Indiana responded. It was a fire that resulted in the line-of-duty death of an assistant fire chief and an extreme close call for others.

Our sincere condolences go out to the family and friends of Assistant Chief Jamie Middlebrook, who lost his life in the line of duty at this fire. Middlebrook, 41, was a 20-year veteran of the New Carlisle Fire Department. Our appreciation goes out to Fire Chief Josh Schweizer and all those firefighters, paramedics, police officers and dispatchers who were involved in this incident.

In this third and final part of this column, we review what may have gone wrong and provide considerations on how to avoid an incident like this at your fire scene. I state “what may have gone wrong” since the final National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) report is not out yet. These general suggestions are based upon the details provided to us by the NCFD leadership as well as review and input from some of those on the scene that evening.

THE BUILDING

The building on fire was a pole-barn-style building with metal siding and roof with wood-truss supports and a pan ceiling. A pan ceiling is a metal ceiling that blocks the truss, creating a cockloft-type area.

On arrival, there were heavy fire conditions through the roof. Taking that into account during a size-up, it’s critical we match the conditions on arrival versus our goal and the available resources. In this case, the goal was water on the fire with no human life factor. A pole barn with fire through the roof is a clear indication that collapse is inevitable. While the goal is water on the fire, and to protect as much of the savable property as possible, the goal also includes the members operating in the hazard zone (fireground) not becoming part of the problem.

• CONSIDER – While the goal of command was to keep all members out of the building and safe, that was not be the final outcome. Training members to understand that what command says is must happen is a discipline and training issue. While on occasion a decision may be made contrary to command, due to an emergency, that is rare. And even in those cases, command must be communicated with so they fully understand what is and what is not happening. Consider drilling with your members in scenarios that clearly teach them the critical importance of fireground discipline and communication when changes are made.

RADIO COMMUNICATIONS

The New Carlisle units switched to what is known as FG2, but some companies on the first alarm did not have access to that channel, creating an interoperability problem. Further compounding the communications problem, an officer took a vehicle from the scene to respond to quarters to get their tower ladder. The problem is that the vehicle taken away had the needed mobile repeater. The inadvertent actions of taking that vehicle away from the scene created radio communications problems. Once the problem was discovered, a secondary mobile repeater was activated and they re-established fireground communications.

• CONSIDER – Take a look at your department along with any other departments that could possibly respond with you. Mutual aid? Automatic aid? Can you easily switch to common radio channels so that you can easily communicate with all units? If not, fix that (meaning coming up with a simple way so that we can all talk on the same fire scene) without excuse.

What factors or “weak links” exist in your radio operational system? Are you reliant on mobile repeaters? What vehicles have them and which don’t? Can mutual aid companies operate or even activate repeaters on your system? Try it now by drilling with all potential units to ensure “real” interoperability.

It is my opinion that while radio costs have skyrocketed, I am not sure “interoperability” is any better in some areas. Simply put, it may be of value to communicate with other agencies such as police or public works on those rare major incidents, but it is critical for FIREFIGHTERS and COMMAND OFFICERS to be able to speak to each other, clearly and simply on every run, every day. Don’t wait until that working fire to find out what works and what doesn’t – now is the time to drill and test YOUR radio system at peak to determine what works and how, along with what “weak links” there may be, and then train everyone who may respond on how to best use the system.

COMMAND, CONTROL & ACCOUNTABILITY

Two separate commands were set up at this fire. A neighboring department that arrived second (the fire was on the border) set up its command at the southwest corner of the building. However, the first arriving department, New Carlisle, had already set up its command at the northeast corner. Because they operate on different systems, their actions were not coordinated.

Some firefighters made a decision to switch pump operator positions and one of those two firefighters reported directly to Assistant Chief Middlebrook, but this switch was done without contacting command. While switches were being made, the incident commander walked to the north end of the building to get a status update. Upon arriving, there was a collapse inside the structure with two members trapped. But know one knew. Command thought no one was in the building. It was later determined that initial driver/operator of EN91 and Assistant Chief Middlebrook were trapped. It wasn’t until that firefighter, who had been the driver operator, but then went inside, called a Mayday that anyone realized members were operating interior – and were now trapped.

The incident commander (IC) immediately re-transmitted the Mayday and all radio traffic was cleared by protocol. The IC utilized Warren Township as the “on-deck” team, functioning as a rapid intervention team (RIT). It should be noted that Warren Township Squad 18 made entry under extreme fire conditions and recovered the firefighter. There was some confusion on the location of Assistant Chief Middlebrook, who could not be found initially. A personnel accountability report (PAR) was called prior to visual confirmation. Within approximately two minutes, it was realized that Assistant Chief Middlebrook was still unaccounted for, and a second team was activated.

While trying to determine who was where, the question was asked by Chief Schweizer “Do you have Jamie?” to the crews removing the first firefighter. The initial answer was yes, but that was incorrect because there were TWO Jamies (Jamie Borders and Jamie Middlebrook) and TWO Middlebrooks. It was moments later, when they were attempting to account for all members, that it was realized that all were not accounted for. It was the father of Assistant Chief Middlebrook (Ex-Chief Robert Middlebrook) who pointed out that his son was still missing. The duplication of names caused confusion in accounting for the members.

There were also very few accountability tags accounted for at that point. All companies not assigned to a task were asked to report to the command post. The decision was made to switch operations from rescue to fire mitigation prior to search efforts. The scene was officially turned over to Warren Township’s chief.

• CONSIDER – There can be only one person “in command” at a fire. Even if it is large enough for a unified command, strict coordination is essential. As a part of size-up, and a 360-degree walk-around, we can physically see any other equipment or units on the scene, just in case there is another department or commander there. This is in addition to the true value of the 360 – fully understanding where the fire is, where it’s going and related size up factors.

Firefighters may not change positions or tasks without their officer being aware and that officer communicating with command. While you “may” want to switch roles or jobs on the fireground, you may not without a reason, authorization and communication. Focus on your job. We need you to do your job. This isn’t about what you want to do – it is about what we need you to do.

Firefighters must also understand that when a fire is determined to be defensive, it is defensive. As much as any of us may have the desire to do more, it is not up to us. Command determines a plan and we follow it. That’s why it is called command.

All members on a scene must be accounted for by the use of an accountability system. The system should identify who they are and their locations and tasks. Find a system that works for you (one that will actually be used) and use it with strict discipline. Also, test the system to see how well it will work in the drilled event of a collapse or emergency.

A fire chief in Florida used an accountability system well before most agencies had even thought of accountability. Using an attached grease pencil, firefighters wrote their names on the inside of the window of the rig we were riding on. Basic. Simple. No cost. It worked.

FIRE OPERATIONS & WATER SUPPLY

Due to conditions upon arrival, the incident was deemed a defensive operation, at which point command was informed by the owner that the building contained an undetermined amount of acetylene tanks and diesel fuel. It was decided to open the doors on the north end of the building to set up an unmanned ground monitor to keep the contents of the building cool. Access was made through both a doorway and overhead door. Smoke conditions were light with good visibility. Assistant Chief Middlebrook was assigned to the north side of the building. EN91 deployed its master stream off tank water (1,000 gallons) and was flowing water on the fire. Unfortunately, while Chief Middlebrook was instructed to not make entry, he made the decision to enter the burning structure to advance the ground monitor closer to the burning acetylene tanks.

• CONSIDER – In rural areas and areas with limited (or lacking) municipal water supply, it’s essential that we understand potential time delays in getting water – a constant flow of needed water-on the fire. Every building can be pre-planned to determine the needed fire flow. ISO can help. So can the National Fire Academy – or just Google “Needed Fire Flow.” Once you have that number, determine what it will take you to meet that flow. Consider time, distance, water fill access, firehouse locations, tanker sizes, maneuverability, dump issues, etc., and plan above and beyond that. It will take time and getting enough companies on the road to get that needed flow going is challenging, so plan for that challenge by doing it on paper and then applying it on the street by drilling regularly with all companies that may be due on the run.

SEARCH & RESCUE

As the RIT members removed the downed firefighter, they heard loud cracking noise and believed the remaining roof structure was starting to collapse on to them. Their officer yelled to “Get Out!” and saw one of his firefighters grab the downed firefighter. Visibility was still good and low heat was felt. Quickly after the RIT officer commanded his crew to exit, visibility was totally lost and extreme heat was felt immediately. He felt debris striking his helmet and back. It was at this time that he believes the secondary collapse occurred. During these moments, he saw his flashlight reflect from a piece of metal to the right of his point of view. He believed this was a fuel tank from a truck they had passed when entering the structure.

The RIT officer dove toward this to protect his head and upper body. He rapidly moved toward what he believed to be the exit, where his facemask struck an unknown material. He then lowered his head and exited the structure to see his fellow RIT firefighter falling to the ground. He immediately checked that member to see if he was safe and uninjured and saw the downed firefighter was being pulled to the right of his point of view. He then looked for his third RIT member. After finding and checking that firefighter to see if he was safe and uninjured, he met with command for a “face to face.”

• CONSIDER – Most recent studies show that the process of firefighter rescue is:

1. Self-removal under our own power.

2. Removal with the help of the crew you are with.

3. Removal by neighboring crews.

4. Removal by a team, such as on-deck RITs.

In this case the team was deployed and assisted in the removal of the surviving firefighter. Firefighters involved in firefighter search and rescue MUST have the skills and training to perform these highly specialized tasks. In the perfect world, every firefighter should possess these skills, such as in this case.

Who provides your on-deck RIT? Are they skilled based on constant training? Do they have the tools and equipment? Is their staffing adequate? Are they on scene before they are needed? What is the policy for on-deck rapid intervention and is this policy standard to all areas you could respond in?

LESSONS LEARNED

What happens before the fire can determine what happens at the fire. While the final investigative reports are not out as of this writing, we already have much we can learn from and honor Assistant Chief Middlebrook’s memory. In general:

• Know the buildings you respond to.

• Understand the value of a size-up report and communicating the incident action plan clearly to all responding companies.

• Life hazard? How do you know?

• Is it a defensive fire? Why?

• An offensive fire? Why?

• How much water is needed (based on your pre-plan and pre-planned first-alarm assignments) and where is it coming from?

• Understand the capability of your radio system, especially when working with automatic aid or mutual aid fire companies.

• Command – One clearly identified incident command that all personnel are aware of.

• Control – Without disciplined control on the fireground, we greatly increase our risk of getting hurt or worse. Control is on behalf of the officers and command, but the critical foundation involves trained, skilled, well-led and disciplined firefighters.

• Accountability – Command (and all personnel on the fireground) must know – and be able to count on – all firefighters expertly performing the tasks they are expected to do without freelancing or being found where command doesn’t expect them.

• Determine your needed fire-flow/water-supply needs and challenges before the fire. Fully understand the realities of getting the needed water to the fire. If that requires 12 tankers on the first alarm to get and maintain 2,000 gpm, so be it.

Take time now to consider the above factors before your next fire. Evaluate your department and your mutual aid companies. Determine where you are strong and not so strong. Prioritize what can be fixed. Develop and set the plan. Stay the course with strict discipline. In the end, it will be well worth it.

Finally, who is who on your fireground? It is not rare for people with the same name to be on a fireground. If your department has three members named “Jones” on the fireground, how will you “at a glance” determine who is who? Add first initials, ranks or whatever works for you so that it IS clear.

WILLIAM GOLDFEDER, EFO, a Firehouse^® contributing editor, has been a firefighter since 1973 and a chief officer since 1982. He is deputy fire chief of the Loveland-Symmes Fire Department in Ohio, an ISO Class 2 and CAAS-accredited department. Goldfeder has served on numerous National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) and International Association of Fire Chiefs (IAFC) committees. He is on the board of directors of the International Association of Fire Chiefs (representing the Safety, Health and Survival Section), National Fallen Firefighters Foundation, September 11th Families Association and National Firefighter Near-Miss Reporting System. Goldfeder and Gordon Graham host the free, non-commercial website www.firefighterclosecalls.com. Goldfeder can be contacted at [email protected].