Lessons Learned: The Gloucester City Tragedy & Three Firefighter Deaths

July traditionally is a time for summer trips and celebrating U.S. independence. In my home state of New Jersey, it also serves as a month of reflection and remembrance, as our state suffered some of the most tragic incidents and line-of-duty deaths in its history in July.

On July 4, 2002, at 1:35 a.m., the Gloucester City, NJ, Fire Department (GCFD) was dispatched to a reported structure fire with entrapment. Approximately 30 minutes into the incident, the structure suffered a catastrophic collapse, trapping three civilians and eight firefighters. Five of the firefighters were rescued, but tragically, three children lost their life, and three firefighters made the ultimate sacrifice attempting to reach those children.

I had sought out GCFD Battalion Chief Mark Campanell to see whether he would be comfortable sharing his thoughts about the incident. He was one of the firefighters who were rescued. He and I wound up talking for two hours about the department, his experiences, family, faith and his passion about continuing change within the department. Campanell’s story isn’t mine to tell, but if you ever have the chance to hear him speak, it would be wise to heed his message.

GCFD: 2002

The GCFD was a combination department in 2002. It responded to approximately 2,400 calls per year, with career staff operating with one firefighter and one lieutenant on the first engine, a chauffeur for the first ladder, and two firefighters in the ambulance, with their turnouts stored in a compartment on the vehicle. Initial response included three volunteer departments that would respond with two engines, a Squrt and personal vehicles.

Overall, the fire service wasn’t as advanced in the early 2000s as it is today. Technology was just emerging in the equipment that we operated. For example, thermal imaging cameras were in their infancy; training on the devices for members was scarce, at best.

The integrated PASS alarm in SCBA was years away. Firefighters used the yellow “brick” on the SCBA waist strap. It was common for members to not turn on the device when they entered a building.

Referenced policies and tactics rarely were documented. The “we have always done it this way” approach was relied on.

In 2002, the volume of alarms and responses was much lower than it is today, which made it much easier to hide one’s inadequacies on the fireground.

This statue sits atop the memorial marker for Stewart.

The incident

The three-story, balloon-style, wood-frame duplex (which is referred to locally as a “twin”) had a full basement. This style of residential construction was prevalent in the town of Gloucester, and homes that are based on it still exist in some areas that haven’t been updated with new housing developments.

Initial units arrived within four minutes and reported heavy fire showing from Unit 200 on the second floor, with victims visible in the windows of Unit 202. Mutual aid was requested by the still-responding chief, for help on scene and for station coverage. Initial exterior hoselines were set into operation to darken down the fire. At 1:51 a.m., command reported good progress on suppression but still had victims unaccounted for.

At 1:57 a.m., interior crews reported that the roof, the ceiling and the floor in Unit 202 were beginning to give way. At 2:00 a.m., command ordered dispatch to broadcast the evacuation message, and all of the apparatus proceeded to sound their air horns.

At the time of the evacuation, two firefighters were reported missing, both on different frequencies without a mayday. Both of those members were located quickly, and a missing civilian was found in the rear of Unit 202. With hope that the three missing children still were alive, a decision was made to resume an interior search for victims.

Conditions began to deteriorate again, and hose streams were put back into service while the interior crew began to exit.

At 2:06 a.m., the structure collapsed, and command reported possibly eight firefighters trapped within the debris. Command immediately requested a second alarm, bringing in heavy rescue units from surrounding metropolitan companies from New Jersey and Pennsylvania. A third alarm and a fourth alarm were requested shortly afterward for staffing, and a staging area was set to rotate rescuers as the search continued.

The rescue/recovery operations continued for more than six hours, with the last firefighter removed at 8:17 a.m.

Investigation: the fallout

In general, one can read reports and documents from organizations and fire safety commissions, but to understand the true dynamics of an event, the words of those who have first-hand experience is best. Those discussions tend to give a more accurate—and not always acceptable or popular—depiction of why decisions were made, actions were taken and results occurred.

One common fact for any department is that it truly has no place to hide. All of a department’s policies, practices, files and faults are exposed and discussed in the public arena. There is a cold reality to being this vulnerable, and the difficult questions must be answered. In the case of the GCFD and the events of July 4, 2002, changes had to be made.

Culture: A common practice within the department of circumventing responsibility instead of taking ownership of one’s limitations needed to end. GCFD members needed to take responsibility for their own personal improvement to their abilities.

Companies fostered a “competitive” position with one another, which led to inadequate coordination of fireground operations.

Training. Support of training at all levels and within both career and volunteer contingencies was poor. A review of the training files on some staff members revealed that some personnel didn’t meet the minimum standards for firefighters.

Tactics. Most decisions and orders weren’t based on documented policies and procedures but were “understood” by members. These tactics were accepted at the department level but weren’t necessarily acceptable practices in the fire service. In some cases, there was a significant delay in tactics being completed on the fireground.

Normalization of deviance. Practicing bad habits continually makes bad habits become the standard. Leaving the PASS alarm off, staying in the environment beyond the low air alarm on the SCBA and not fastening all of the enclosures on PPE all can lead to disastrous results. Firefighters are ordered out of buildings many times during incidents, and delays occur; unfortunately, on July 4, 2002, the building collapsed within 30 seconds of the order.

Communications. Radios only were given to the company officer. Radio communications between mutual-aid companies weren’t compatible with each other. Those companies couldn’t talk to each other on scene. Communications between police/fire/EMS weren’t operable; in some cases, messages that did get through were inaccurate or convoluted.

Personnel. Requesting adequate personnel for the needs of an incident is paramount. In some cases, rapid intervention teams were put right to work on arrival instead of standing by in the event of an emergency.

In this incident, weather conditions and time of year taxed on-scene resources, and a large personnel resource pool was needed. Recalled personnel regularly responded directly to incidents in their personal vehicles, adding to the accountability issues at the command post.

Special operations. The field of technical rescue/urban search and rescue is dynamic. Having resources that are capable of responding with required apparatus, personnel and equipment was dependent on local departments that might have a specialized unit and staff that can perform collapse rescue.

Lessons enforced

It became abundantly clear that changes at all levels had to be made. The GCFD embarked on a new path toward ensuring that this tragedy served as a catalyst of change toward the current standards of performance that now are embraced on all levels. These changes include:

Culture: Circumvention of responsibility no longer is tolerated, and accountability of performance and abilities is defined for all members, regardless of rank.

Training. Improved training benchmarks and programs for all ranks now are in place. This started with a full “Back to Basics” approach for all members.

When new equipment arrives, full training for all members must be completed prior to the equipment being placed into service. Documentation of completed knowledge, skills and abilities is kept on all members, and training is encouraged at all levels for those who seek to improve their performance. Documentation of annual performance evaluations is done as well.

Tactics. Updated and researched tactics now take the form of Standing Orders, based on accepted standards, and regular review occurs when policies are updated and disseminated within the ranks. Specifically assigned rapid intervention crews (RIC) now are dispatched on initial alarm assignments. They are back-filled in the event that they are put to work.

Accountability. Recalled personnel no longer respond directly to the incident scene. Staff report to headquarters and deploy as a company.

Communications. Radios now are assigned to each member who is on shift, and communication agreements are in place between automatic-aid companies.

Personnel. The GCFD no longer responds as one team, with the duty officer on one of the apparatus. A battalion chief now is in a command vehicle, and company officers are in charge of the performance of company functions and responsibilities. This was a significant paradigm shift; for years, the department didn’t operate within the Company Concept. To train the members in this concept, ride-along agreements with neighboring departments that utilize the Company Concept were set in place. The members returned to the GCFD and provided first-hand experience to put together the current GCFD Company Concept.

Special operations. Today, numerous resources at the local, county and state levels are available to deploy as task forces throughout the state to provide collapse and urban search and rescue capabilities.

The site of the incident, which now is an empty corner lot, includes flags that are placed where the bodies of the three firefighters and the three children who perished in the collapse were found.

Accountability

It took a lot of sweat, perseverance and tears from a lot of determined people in the GCFD moving forward. It can’t be overstated how great a job then-Chief William Glassman did in handling the post-incident changes to transform the department.

I’m most grateful to Campanell for his willingness to discuss this incident and his experiences with me.

The day after our discussion was July 4. I made the trek down the turnpike that day to pay my respects at both the Memorial site and the incident location.

Today, the incident site is an empty corner lot, except for six U.S. flags, specifically placed, and six freshly cut red roses.

The Memorial is located on the property of the GCFD. As I stood in silence, I developed my own “lessons” that were enforced in me.

It’s reassuring to know that there still are fire service leaders, such as Campanell, who won’t apologize for their passion, commitment and purpose to hold all members of our profession accountable to their responsibilities. I will continue to stand shoulder to shoulder with them and deliver the same message.

A quote from Campanell should resonate with us all: “You do not have the right to be ignorant to the problem, no matter what it is; to the requirements of your job; to your responsibility to your company and department members; to your performance on the incident scene.”

So, how did you spend the past Fourth of July? This year, I chose to go for a ride.

This column is dedicated to the memory of Thomas Stewart III, James Sylvester and John West.