This Month in Fire History - Nov. 2024

November brings the beginning of the holiday season. Families will gather at homes or hotels, friends may party at nightclubs and firefighters will respond to the tragedies that may occur at these gatherings. Did you know that some of the deadliest hotel and nightclub fires in U.S. history happened in the month of November?

Nov. 21, 1980, Las Vegas—MGM Grand Hotel Fire

On Nov. 21, 1980, one of the deadliest hotel fires in U.S. history occurred at the MGM Grand Hotel and Casino in Las Vegas. The fire killed 85 people, including 78 hotel guests and 7 employees. Approximately 600–700 people, including 14 firefighters, were injured. Most of the deaths occurred on the upper floors of the hotel due to smoke inhalation and carbon monoxide poisoning. The MGM Grand only had sprinklers in very few locations.

On the 30th anniversary of the deadly fire, Firehouse columnist Azarang (Ozzie) Mirkhah recounted the tragedy and shared lessons learned.

“At 7:05 a.m. on Nov. 21, 1980, [an electrical] fire broke out in 'The Deli' restaurant in the MGM Grand Hotel and Casino. Within six minutes, the entire casino area (450,000 square feet) was involved in fire, at a burning rate of 15 to 19 feet per second. At 7:17, the Clark County, NV, Fire Department received a call reporting the fire and arrived two minutes later. Crews were only 40 feet into the hotel when a huge fireball burst out and rolled into the casino, forcing the crews out of the building as the flames rolled out of the front entrance.

“From the reports and the events timeline, a third alarm was called at 7:22 a.m. and units from the CCFD and the City of Las Vegas Fire Department (LVFD) responded promptly. By 7:25 a.m., the entire casino and porte-cochere on the west side of the building were fully involved. At 7:30 a.m., a Metro Police helicopter pilot requested all available helicopters to the scene. At 7:50 a.m., the fire was controlled on the east sector. And by 8:30 a.m. the main casino fire was controlled. As a result of the firefighters' quick knockdown, fire damage was limited to the ground floor casino and adjacent restaurants and did not extend to the high-rise hotel.”

Firehouse.com ran a story, “MGM Grand Blaze That Claimed 85 Remembered” on the eve of the 30th anniversary that quoted retired fire Capt. Michael Dillingham, who responded top that call.

"It was really surreal," he said. "You pull up and there's a big veil of smoke and (you) hear glass breaking, people screaming."

Dillingham said he remembered raising the ladder on his truck to rescue people trapped inside, aiding in the rescue of several hundred people.

"We did what we could, but you can't reach those people up above," he said.

Out of the 85 fatalities, four died of as a result of burns, one jumped out of the building, and 80 died of smoke inhalation and carbon monoxide. Eighteen of the victims were located on the casino floor, and the remaining 67 were on floors 16 through 26.

Part of the problem, Dillingham said, was that everything inside the casino was combustible and the ventilation system helped to fill the air with toxins.

"The people up there (on the higher floors) were beside themselves," he said. "They broke windows, they threw stuff out."

As stated in Mirkhah’s column, “Later newspaper articles indicated that there were 83 building code violations, design flaws, installation errors and materials that were identified afterward that contributed to the magnitude of the fire and smoke spread. They indicated that as a result, there were 1,327 lawsuits against 118 companies. Money from all the companies went into a $223 million settlement fund that was promptly distributed to the victims within three years of the fire. MGM's $105 million settlement was the largest and with the settlement no negligence was admitted.

“Not more than three months after the fire, the state's building and fire codes were revised to have the most stringent fire sprinkler and life safety requirements in the country. All hotels taller than 55 feet were required to be retrofitted with fire sprinkler systems. And all future buildings three stories or more were required to be sprinklered also.

“As a result, the MGM Grand fire underlined the importance of fire prevention for the fire departments in Southern Nevada. Fire departments recognized that, as an integral part of the fire service, the fire prevention division's involvement and active participation in the construction review and inspection process is essential, and not only provides for the safety of the public, but also has direct impact on the firefighters' safety. The fire departments started recruiting the expertise and expanding their fire prevention division's role in the plans review phase of projects, and in performing in-depth inspections of the fire protection and life safety systems for all new buildings.”

Nov. 25, 2002, Coos Bay, OR—Auto Supply Store Roof Collapse

An explosive fire at an auto body shop in downtown Coos Bay, OR, on Nov. 25, 2002, killed three firefighters when the roof of the building collapsed.

According to a Firehouse.com news report, witnesses said they heard a loud explosion and saw the roof of the body shop cave in. Two firefighters, 45-year-old Randall Carpenter and 30-year-old Jeffery Edward Common, died on scene. A third firefighter, Robert Charles Hanner, 33, was pronounced dead on arrival at Bay Area Hospital in Coos Bay.

"Firefighters climbed some stairs leading to an upper floor when a rafter dislodged and the roof caved in on the firefighters," said Coos Bay police Capt. Eura Washburn.

State Fire Marshal Robert Garrison said that grease being incinerated in a furnace at a parts-cleaning operation at the Farwest Truck & Auto Supply store caused the combustion of roofing materials that burst into flames when they came in contact with a supply of oxygen.

"That fire probably burned for many hours without being detected," Garrison said. "Consequently, it had done extensive damage to the construction of the building, especially the roof, without being seen."

Once the blaze began in earnest, aerosol cans, paints, hydraulic fluid, paint thinners and motor oils stored at the auto supply accelerated the massive blaze that sent caustic black plumes shooting hundreds of feet into the air. Explosions burst in pops of flames and burned so hot temperature increases could be felt 50 feet away.

The three Coos Bay firefighters were most remembered now for bravery and selflessness.

OSHA conducted a nearly six-month investigation that found 16 violations of federal safety standards, 13 of them classified as serious. The findings resulted in $50,450 in fines against the city of Coos Bay.

"We must learn from this tragedy," said Peter De Luca, commissioner of the Occupational Safety and Health Division as he unveiled the findings. "If we do not learn, then this tragedy is that much greater."

Firehouse.com also reported that the shop owner and contractor were sentenced to jail time for their role in the fatal fire. Shop owner Jonathan Inskeep and contractor Verlin Glenn Villines pleaded no contest to misdemeanor charges of recklessly endangering the lives of the firefighters. In return, prosecutors dropped felony charges of criminally negligent homicide.

Nov. 28, 1942, Boston—Cocoanut Grove Nightclub Fire

The Cocoanut Grove Nightclub Fire is considered the deadliest nightclub fire in history and the third-deadliest single-building fire in U.S. history.

On Nov. 28, 1942, the Cocoanut Grove Nightclub overflowed with customers. The club, which had a legal capacity of 460 people, had more than 1,000 patrons in attendance that night.

At approximately 10:15 p.m., a small fire broke out in the basement level. Survivors and authorities have long disputed the source, but witnesses agree that the flames began in the Melody Lounge, a cocktail lounge in the club’s basement, and quickly spread through the building with the help of flammable decorations, cloth-covered ceilings, and cocoanut palms, according to the NFPA.

According to Britannica, the only entrance to the “Grove,” built in 1917, was the revolving front door. Other exits had been bricked or welded shut during Prohibition when the club was one of Boston’s hottest speakeasies.

Tragically, 492 people died and another 166 were injured.

Firehouse.com ran a story that appeared in the Boston Herald on the 75th anniversary of the event in which some survivors told their stories.

“Marshall Cole, who was a 16-year-old tap dancer when the popular nightspot went up in flames, told those gathered that the tragic events of Nov. 28, 1942, are never far from his mind.

‘From there on out, whenever I go to a place, I look for an exit,’ Cole, 91, told the hundreds gathered at the Revere Hotel Boston Common, which sits in part on the same stretch of Stuart Street where the Cocoanut Grove once stood.

‘You can’t understand what fear can be, when all of a sudden you realize something big is happening and you could get hurt,’ he said.”

“Kenneth Marshall, who heads the Cocoanut Grove Memorial Committee and was a 4-year-old when the fire occurred, called the tragedy “a profound episode that has not left our psyche.

“Marshall said his mother, a nurse, worked for four days straight — without coming home — after the fire.”

The fire led to significant changes in building codes and safety practices across the United States. Laws were enacted requiring public establishments to have a minimum of two clearly marked exits, with doors that swing outward. Regulations mandated that revolving doors must either be flanked by at least one normal, outward-swinging door or be retrofitted to fold flat in emergencies. Illuminated exit signs and emergency lighting became mandatory, with independent power sources to ensure visibility even in thick smoke.

Laws were also passed banning the use of flammable decorations in public establishments and requirements for automatic fire sprinkler systems were introduced, depending on occupant load and building configuration.

Nov. 29, 1988, Kansas City, MO—Construction Site Explosion

In the early morning hours of Nov. 29, 1988, a tragic explosion occurred at a highway construction site in Kansas City, Missouri, resulting in the deaths of six firefighters.

On the 30th anniversary of the event, Firehouse columnist Robert Burke recounted the incident.

“On Nov. 29, 1988, at approximately 3:40 a.m., the Kansas City Fire Department received a call reporting a fire at a highway construction site. A security guard on site reported the fire to be in a small pickup truck; however, a woman in the background, another security guard, could be heard saying ‘the explosives are on fire.’

“Pumper 41 arrived on scene at 3:46 a.m. and found two separate fires burning. A second pumper company was requested. Pumper 41 also requested that dispatch warn Pumper 30 of the potential for explosives at the site. Pumper 30 was dispatched and arrived on scene at 3:52 a.m. Because there were two separate fires at the site, the crew from Pumper 30 suspected arson and requested that the police be dispatched to the scene as well.

“Following the extinguishment of the pickup truck fire, Pumper 41 proceeded to the other fire to assist Pumper 30. There was a truck, a trailer and a compressor on fire at 4:02 a.m. None of the vehicles or trailer appeared to be marked. There were no indications that the firefighters suspected any explosives were involved in the fires they were attempting to extinguish. As it turns out, the “trailer” that was on fire was actually an explosives magazine.

“At 4:08 a.m., 22 minutes after Pumper 41 arrived and approximately 16 minutes after Pumper 30 arrived, the magazine exploded, killing all six firefighters assigned to Pumper 41 and Pumper 30.

“Battalion Chief 107, Marion Germann, and his driver were just arriving on scene and stopped about a quarter-mile from the explosion. They received minor injuries when the windshield of their vehicle was blown in. Following the first explosion, Germann ordered firefighters to withdraw from the area and a Command Post was set up at a safe distance from the site.

“Approximately 40 minutes after the first explosion, a second blast occurred, followed by several smaller explosions. It is likely that Germann’s actions prevented additional deaths and injuries.”

An investigation determined that the fire was deliberately set, and in 1997, five people were convicted and sentenced to life in prison for the firefighters' deaths. However, the U.S. Attorney's Office requested a review of the case by the Department of Justice, which found that while the five convicted individuals were likely guilty, two other individuals (presumably the security guards) may have been involved.

In the aftermath of this tragedy, the Kansas City Fire Department formed the Kansas City Hazardous Materials Team. Hazmat 71 (HM71), the name of its E-One hazmat vehicle, is a combination of the number 30 and 41, in honor of the personnel from pumper companies 30 and 41 were lost during the 1988 explosion.

We remember the Kansas City Fire Department firefighters killed in the explosion: