On Feb. 12, 2011, I was working as the captain of Ladder Company 10 in the Kensington section of Philadelphia. Like every day in the firehouse all is normal and relaxed until the bells start ringing. On this occasion we were dispatched for a reported dwelling fire. As we approached the area, a column of smoke was visible over the neighborhood rooftops. Engine 7, housed together with us, was already on location in front of the property maybe 50-60 feet down the street. Fire was shooting from the second-floor windows of a two-story, single-family, row-type dwelling. Thousands of these dwellings make up the neighborhoods of Philadelphia and the most common dimensions are 15 x 35 feet consisting of three small bedrooms and a small bathroom on the second floor.
Engine 7 was already playing a line into the second-floor window and I could see a lone police officer standing near their apparatus. Instinctively, I assumed they needed forcible entry since they were playing the line from the street. As I was exiting the cab of the truck I heard the dispatch center updating the information for this job. They were now reporting that it was possibly a barricaded person was on location. That would explain the police presence.
I grabbed a TNT tool and scurried to the front of the house. I assumed the front door was locked or barricaded so I gave it a quick hit. To my surprise it flew right open without resistance. Engine 7’s crew automatically moved their hoseline through the open front door. I followed them inside where we found an adult male dead on the floor from and obvious gunshot wound to the head. Simultaneously, Engine 7’s crew began to advance their hoseline up the steps to the second floor. I was preoccupied with the deceased, trying to determine if this was the barricaded man dispatch was talking about. Other victims were a distinct possibility. However, as I quickly scanned the scene, I was struck that there was no firearm in evidence. About that time I could see the glow from the fire in the stairwell. Engine 7’s crew was on the stairs when debris started to fall down on them.
Time to exit the home
Smoke was packing down in the dwelling, water was seeping through the ceiling and I started to think the ceiling was collapsing. At that point the captain of Engine 7 turned to me and simply said "run." Out of respect I didn’t question that simple command. I instinctively knew he wasn’t kidding. Together with one member of my crew we hurdled the dead man and ran out the back of the first floor, through the small kitchen and into the alley.
Engine 7 retreated back through the front door the way we came in. I was confused as the lieutenant of Engine 25 (who came in through the door we ran out) seemed to be talking to someone still inside, looking up toward the second floor. We started to yell at him to come out. At this point several uniformed police officers entered the now smoke-filled dwelling through the front door and began yelling. The lieutenant retreated. The police officers were facing up the stairs, yelling with their guns drawn. They were yelling expletives the way big city police officers do when they mean business. In an instant a lengthy barrage of gunfire erupted. The officers couldn’t have been 25 feet away, directly facing us. We kept looking up at the second-floor window, directly above us in case someone appeared. When the shooting stopped we decided to make a run for it. For some reason (I still have no idea why) we ran back through the house (again over the dead man) out the front door and up the street. Without a doubt this was the most intense 20 minutes of my career.
After collecting myself, I conferred with the incident commander. The fire was now raging out of the second-floor window. The police by this time had a large presence on scene. The decision was made to take no further offensive action in the house. Speculation was that the gunman was dead, but that was unconfirmed. The police told us the SWAT team was on the way but they would take approximately 30 minutes to arrive because they were training. Until then we had to let the house burn and play a few unmanned hoses on the property to keep the fire from extending. Eventually the roof caved in. The SWAT team finally arrived and confirmed what we all knew an hour before: the shooter was most likely dead—either from police gunfire or the now raging inferno. We were given the go-ahead to extinguish the fire and made short work of it. Three victims were removed from the property: the male deceased in the living room, a female and the shooter who Engine 7 encountered on the second-floor landing.
I’ve often thought about this incident over the years. Lately, I have been thinking about it a lot more. It’s a miracle no firefighters lost their lives on this job. Engine 7’s tip man literally came face to face with an armed assailant who had just murdered two people. Had he decided to start shooting we were all in big trouble as we were bunched up in the tiny living room. We had no idea what was actually going on at this scene.
Defining active shooter
Today we call this an active shooter. We can haggle over how we define an active shooter, but in my book a murderer in possession of a firearm at a crime scene fits the criteria. Driven by the Columbine massacre, many police departments are now training patrol officers to team up to intervene immediately when called to an active shooter situation. Part of this new approach is to take EMS personnel with them. I have strong reservations about this strategy.
Active shooters are getting a lot of attention as the fire service gets more involved in these incidents due to the mass casualties. Many departments including my own are attempting to “train” for these scenarios. I’m not sure the fire service is fully aware what it’s getting itself into.
For an entire generation we have trained first responders to observe strict “scene safety.” It was drilled into our heads in fire school as we went through our EMS training on the way to becoming certified EMT’s. Responding to shootings, stabbings, assaults and other violent incidents is dicey business, especially if the aggressor is still on scene. Domestic incidents are still the most dangerous for our law enforcement colleagues. While fire and EMS have had a role to play in these incidents for years, it was always understood that the police would secure the scene before we got involved. Our protocol was always to use caution until police arrived on location, or even stand by depending upon the nature and details. Now first responders are being drawn into and in some instances even encouraged to get involved with scenes that are not fully secured. I think this is a dangerous shift in thinking.
An eye opener
Rand Street was an eye opener for me. While not an outright Charlie-Hebdo or Columbine massacre it makes no difference. Jumping over dead bodies while a house burns down around you as the police shoot an armed suspect is quite enough for one shift. In this case the odds favored the police. But what if it wasn’t a single suspect like San Bernardino, CA? What if he had an AK-47 instead of a pistol? The results are obvious as we have seen recently in Dallas where a suspect armed with a rifle literally walked up to a police officer armed with a pistol and executed him at point blank range.
It’s no secret there are plenty of individuals who want to do harm to emergency workers. It doesn’t matter if they’re police, fire or EMS. They view us as part of the “system.” There’s a big difference between your everyday street crime and terrorism. Terrorists are often out to inflict as much damage as possible in the shortest period of time. They are often heavily armed or plant devices such as Improvised Explosive Devices (IED’s) often set at intervals to kill and maim successive waves of emergency workers as they arrive after the initial event. Part of their strategy is to actively draw in responders in order to attack them as well. Non-law enforcement emergency workers are extremely vulnerable in these circumstances and should not be hazarded until a clear picture of the event is established and the individual or individuals are neutralized and the area secured for operations.
One of our strengths in the fire and EMS service is the ability to “flood the zone” of an incident with personnel and resources quickly. This was exactly the case when an Amtrak train derailed here in Philadelphia recently. Police officers bravely rushed to the scene and climbed on top of and into the derailed passenger cars. Incident command and triage went right in the window. Luckily the cars were not energized or the tragedy could have been greatly compounded. Now replace the train derailment with a terrorist attack at a shopping mall. Should we be putting our people into incidents where the details are not fully known or before the scope of the scene is apparent?
When to act
It’s understood there is great pressure on the emergency services to “do something” when people are hurt or injured. However the reality is SWAT teams were invented for a reason. That reason is SWAT teams are the best way to deal with heavily armed suspects. It will only take one multiple shooter incident where first responders are killed or injured to illustrate our vulnerability.
How far are you willing to let your people go into an active shooter scene? In Philadelphia, the fire department has established “RAMS” teams. These teams of three paramedics are supposed to follow after the initial police entry team goes looking for the active shooter. However the training for these teams is unrealistic, sanitized and antiseptic. In an effort to “train” as many responders as possible, realism in training takes a back seat. This is unconscionable.
Advocates of this type of EMS intervention in unsecured, mass shooting incidents point out incidents like Columbine as defining the discussion. I think they’re mistaken in their assessment. Mainly, they mistakenly conclude they are all the same. There’s an enormous difference between some high school kid who is off his meds or a mentally ill individual and dedicated, trained, religious fanatics/terrorists. That difference is in planning, execution, training, equipment, strategy, tactics, intent, competence, funding, size and scope of the attack and a host of other issues. If we look at the attacks in Mumbai, India or Beslan, Russia we can see a clear difference.
The average firefighter/EMT is woefully unprepared and under trained to be placed into what’s essentially a battlefield environment. Most police officers go through their entire careers never firing their weapon, except in training. The decision to assault a terrorism scene or contain it is a difficult one for police. Assaulting a hostage situation can do more harm than good. Likewise, not assaulting can just as easily lead to further casualties at the hands of the killers. However, this is a decision police commanders get paid to make, not firefighters or paramedics. It’s up to police departments to allocate the proper funding, equipment, manpower and training to ensure rapid response to active shooter events. It’s not the role of fire and EMS to compromise our training to cover philosophical or funding differences with law enforcement. If the fire service doesn’t take a step back and re-evaluate our involvement in these situations, you won’t need a crystal ball to see the future—Fire and EMS LODD’s at active shooter scenes. The solutions/requirements are straight forward:
- Realistic, combined training for fire service and police agencies.
- Police departments bulking up their response profiles, including getting as many long gun and body armor equipped officers to the scene as fast as possible.
- Rapidly gaining control of a scene and clearing it so fire and EMS crews can safely do their jobs.
- Implementing the incident command as quickly as possible.
Rand Street showed me how quickly these incidents can escalate and how deadly they can be.
These are not new concepts. Firefighters have always been trained to stand by and assess a scene when it’s not under control. Utility emergencies are a case in point. We don’t jump over energized power lines, we wait for utility crews to shut them down. Gas leaks, mechanical emergencies, confined spaces and yes hostage situations have taught firefighters and paramedic’s valuable lessons about scene safety. We assist where we can and allow those responsible for systems and services to render those systems safe before we intervene. That includes people wielding firearms. Those lessons were often paid for in blood and blood is too valuable to pay for something twice. Stay safe.
DENNIS MERRIGAN has been with the Philadelphia Fire Department for 24 years and serves as a battalion chief. As a fire officer, Merrigan has worked on improvements in the department, including helping implement a hearing conservation program, getting cellar pipes re-deployed on engine companies and reorganizing a battalion. Merrigan, a U.S. Army veteran, holds a master’s degree in emergency management from Millesville University, a bachelor’s degree in emergency management from Empire State College and a number of certifications from the Pro Board and National Fire Academy.
