Close Calls: Floor Collapse Traps Firefighters

On Jan. 12, 2015 the Sacramento, CA, Fire Department (SFD) responded to a single-family dwelling fire. While operating at this fire, three firefighters from SFD Engine Company 6 experienced a catastrophic floor collapse that resulted in two firefighters being trapped in a basement. One firefighter self-extricated while the other needed to be rescued. Three crewmembers were subsequently transported to the hospital for treatment of their injuries.

The Engine 6 nozzle firefighter sustained second- and third-degree burns to the hands, forearms and rear thighs. The Engine 6 backup firefighter sustained second- and third-degree burns to the wrists as well as multiple fractures to the left wrist. The Engine 6 captain suffered a mild respiratory burn in the throat and a muscular shoulder injury.

SFD overview

The SFD provides fire suppression, ALS transportation, hazmat response, technical rescue operations, fire prevention and public education to the citizens of Sacramento and to the contract areas of the unincorporated portions of Sacramento County. The department is also the sponsoring agency for the Sacramento Urban Search & Rescue Team, Task Force 7. The SFD has a long tradition of being an aggressive interior attack department.

Currently the department staffs 24 engine companies, eight truck companies, one rescue company and three battalion chiefs, all covering an area of 98 square miles in the incorporated portion of the city and the 45 square miles of unincorporated Sacramento County. The population in 2013 was 479,686. The daily population swells to over 1 million people during peak work hours.

The total daily suppression strength is 161 members, and the total ALS ambulance strength is 26.

SFD operational guidelines

The SFD suppression companies operate under pre-established standard operating guidelines (SOGs). The SOGs outline general practices used on emergency incidents and special situations, as well as basic roles for engine company members, truck company members, medics, battalion chiefs and staff officers during fire operations.

A component of the SOGs is pre-assigned riding positions and basic assignment on the fireground, based on what company a member is on, the arrival order for that company, and the type of occupancy the company is responding to. For example, the nozzle firefighter of the first-due engine is responsible for deploying the fire attack line. The tool firefighter on a truck company is responsible for bringing the proper tools and assisting with forcible entry and search.

Currently, the SOGs are divided into three basic sections: 

• Section 1—Residential fires
• Section 2—Commercial fires 
• Section 3—High-rise fires

Each section contains operational guidelines for each type of incident. The SOGs are an important function of the SFD’s operational success and provide continuity and consistency to the operations. The SOGs are only used as a guideline for officers on the fireground and are not designed to be strictly adhered to, as a policy would be. Officers are given the freedom to deviate from a given SOG if the situation dictates that a deviation is in the best interest of the companies on scene and the overall stabilization of the incident.

The fire response

The fire was dispatched at 0625 hrs on a very foggy morning. The first alarm assignment consisted of Battalion Chiefs 1 and 2, Engines 10, 6, 56 and 12, Trucks 10 and 6, and Medic 10. The battalion chiefs drive themselves, the fire companies have four firefighters each, and the medic has two firefighters.

On an engine company, the pre-assigned riding positions are captain, engineer, nozzle firefighter and backup firefighter. The riding position identifiers on the truck company are captain, engineer, saw firefighter and tools firefighter. 

If a department member is calling a particular company, then the officer will answer the radio for that company (e.g., “Engine 1, Engine 2”). If one member needs to talk to a particular company member, then that member is identified by their riding position and company identifier (e.g., “Truck 1 Captain, Truck 1 Saw”).

These riding positions are identified by rank and function, with each position having a name and set of basic responsibilities on any given emergency. All company members are identified by their riding position and the company to which they are assigned.

Engine company

A) Nozzle firefighter

1. Under direction of the engine captain, deploys appropriate hoseline to the directed location and engages in direct interior or indirect exterior fire attack.

2. As two out, deploys the appropriate hoseline to the directed location and stages at correct location to deploy, if needed, as a secondary fire attack or exposure line.

B) Backup firefighter

1. Responsible for the irons (flathead axe and Halligan), the can (2 1/5-gallon water extinguisher), 6-foot New York hook and attic ladder.

2. Responsible for light forcible entry, ensuring the hoseline(s) are deployed correctly, and assisting with hoseline advancement of the primary and/or secondary fire attack line(s) during fire attack operations.

Truck company

A) Tools firefighter

1. Tools firefighter and captain make up the inside team when splitting.

2. Responsible for light and heavy forcible entry, primary search, secondary search, rescue, salvage and overhaul.

B) Saw firefighter

1. Saw firefighter and engineer make up the outside team when splitting.

2. Responsible for exterior ventilation, securing utilities and exterior rescue, and wiill assist salvage and overhaul.

C) Splitting: captain/tools firefighter is inside, and engineer/saw firefighter is outside.

D) Splitting opposite: captain/engineer is outside, and saw firefighter/tools firefighter is inside. The captain can opt to take one of the firefighters and send the engineer inside.

All reference to members involved in this article will be referred to by their riding positions. 

The dwelling and floor collapse

The dwelling was built in 1932 and was a two-story, 1,860-square-foot dwelling with a 20 x 15-foot unfinished basement. The home, as built, was 1,860 square feet, consisting of 1,000 square feet on the first floor and 860 square feet on the second. The data lists a basement, but it is considered unfinished by building code. The 20' x 15' basement area consists of smooth finished concrete walls that are 7 feet 6 inches tall from ground to first floor joist. The home appears to have been remodeled, with the addition of a stucco exterior, dual pane vinyl windows and a rubberized metal roof. The walls and ceiling are lathe and plaster, with the flooring in the collapse area consisting of 2 1/4-inch hardwood strips.

The fire originated in the basement. The area of origin included numerous electrical wires and an old furnace that was converted to gas at some point. The floor joists in the area of origin were consumed by fire, and adjacent joists were compromised during the fire. As a result of the compromised floor joists, a full-size refrigerator located above the fire origin breached the floor and fell partially into the basement.

Upon their arrival, the firefighters had heavy smoke showing from numerous locations. Neighbors, not occupants, met the firefighters outside. Those neighbors were unable to provide information about the occupants. Initial size-up (including the use of a thermal imaging camera) indicted fire on the Bravo and Charlie sides as well as through ground level vents. This information was not transmitted over the radio. 

The fire on the B/C side was only initially visible from the exterior with the TIC due to heavy smoke. Also, the fire conditions not transmitted were only noticed after a fence was opened to the Bravo side by a truck crew while Engine 6 was making entry.

This home did not present as having a conventional basement that covered the entire underside of the home. The SFD firefighters actually learned later that this was just a small boiler basement, which is why there was no exterior entrance to it. 

As firefighters made entry, they fell through the floor to where the fire was burning in the basement.

Timeline of firefighter rescue

0625 hrs: Units were dispatched for a house fire.

0627 hrs: Dispatch updated visible flames seen from under the home.

0628:38: “Engine 6 on scene A side two-story residential, looks like we have occupants out front. Smoke showing, but no visible flame. Engine 6 taking fire attack. We have a hydrant across the street.”

Firefighter Alex Galang (Engine 6 nozzle) pulled a 150-foot preconnect to the A/B corner front door for fire attack while Firefighter Adam McKahan (Engine 6 backup) pulled the security screen open and began forcing the front door.

Engine 10 arrived simultaneously with Engine 6. “Engine 10 we've got two out and command.”

Firefighter Marcos Mejia (Engine 10 backup) assisted McKahan with forcing the door while Firefighter David Robinson (Engine 10 nozzle) pulled a 150-foot preconnect from Engine 10. The engineers from Engine 6 and 10 began securing a water supply from across the street. 

06:29:03: Truck 10 arrived and split with the captain inside. 

06:29:49: Truck 6 arrived and split opposite.

06:30:07: Galang knocked down some fire on the ceiling as he entered the structure and advanced to the left (B side) toward the main body of the fire. He made it approximately 6 feet when the floor collapsed beneath him, sending him into a concrete-encased basement approximately 7 ½ feet tall. His helmet came off during the fall or shortly thereafter. McKahan fed hose as he moved up the line in heavy smoke and, unable to see, fell into the hole. With this new gulp of air, the entire basement “exploded with fire,” according to Captain Pimentel. Pimentel fell to his stomach but was able to arrest his fall at the edge of the hole. 

06:31:31: McKahan transmitted “mayday” and shortly after (06:31:38) transmitted “mayday, mayday.” Unfortunately, both these transmissions, given while surrounded by fire, went unrecognized due to the radio unknowingly being moved to the wrong TAC channel. Firefighter Robinson recognized the increased fire conditions on the interior and advanced the two-out line just inside the doorway and knocked down fire in the overhead.

Pimentel was attempting to grab either firefighter and pull them out of the hole. After multiple failed attempts, McKahan was able to get out with the assistance of Firefighter Galang. Both McKahan and Pimentel yelled back to Robinson and Mejia to move up and hit the fire, which they could not see very well through the heavy smoke. Robinson advanced through the smoke and knocked down the fire in the hole surrounding Galang. The fire was reduced to an area of the Bravo/Charlie corner of the basement but was still being fed by an open gas line. 

06:32:49: Captain Pimentel gave two matching transmissions approximately 20 seconds apart: “Command Engine 6, mayday, mayday, mayday.” Battalion Chief 1 acknowledged the second mayday and immediately ordered a second alarm and additional TAC channels from dispatch. During that time, Battalion Chief 2 arrived on scene, took command and acknowledged the mayday.

Pimentel, McKahan, Mejia and Robinson, all stuck working from only one side of the hole, attempted to pull Galang out of the hole. Attempts were made at a hand-to-hand rescue as well as multiple attempts to use the hoseline to pull him out, but all were unsuccessful. The difficulties of having all members restricted to operating on one side of the collapsed hole made the removal techniques previously learned ineffective. During these attempts, both of Galang’s gloves came off. 

06:33:35: Pimentel then updated command, “Command, Engine 6, we've got a man in a basement, heavy fire, we need assistance.” McKahan retrieved a 10-foot attic ladder from Engine 6 and put it in the hole. The ladder apparently settled on unstable debris, causing it to fall into the hole in a location from which Galang could not retrieve it. As the rescue attempts continued, Galang began to experience extreme fatigue and became increasingly less able to assist in his rescue. Mejia retrieved a second attic ladder, which was placed in the hole and opened on a stable area. The rescuers had to encourage Galang, who was at complete exhaustion and very low on air, to step up on the ladder. With fatigue setting in, all rescuers were also in a state of low-air alarm activation. Galang managed to get one foot up on the ladder but then fell back down into the hole and was unable to be seen through the smoke. After an agonizing moment, he reappeared and began to attempt to step on the ladder again. 

06:38:40: Once Galang got one foot and both hands on the ladder, crews were able to pin his hands on the ladder and remove the entire ladder with him on it. The ladder knocked Pimentel on his back and dislodged his SCBA mask to the side, exposing him to the hot caustic smoke, which caused a moderate respiratory injury. Galang was removed to the front lawn where his SCBA, now just a few breaths from empty, was removed.

Galang was taken to the hospital for treatment of his injuries. Within minutes, Captain Pimentel and Firefighter McKahan would realize their own injuries and subsequently be transported as well. A PAR was conducted as the operation went defensive for a time, allowing Command to regroup and account for all remaining personnel.

Galang later explained that, "It felt spongy and then I hear crack, crack. I'm now falling head first in and flipped, landing on my back in the basement. It was hot and all I could see is fire. I thought THIS HAS TO BE A BAD DREAM."

Incident observations

This was a close call in the truest sense of the term. Fortunately, this firefighter was rescued because a lot went correctly, which doesn't happen by accident. It comes from training, training and more training—hands-on training based upon organizational guidelines and historic reality (incidents that have occurred in the past and from which we all must learn). As we have seen so many times before, a number of factors led to the fireground emergency.

Command issues

The SFD has aggressively trained all SFD battalion chiefs for firefighter emergencies by providing the “Commanding the Mayday” training annually. However, the focus of the training is for an incident that is well established with considerable resources on scene. If the incident occurs while the command officer is still en route, with only the initial resources on scene or still arriving, company officers are in command. The problem: They have not gone through the Commanding The Mayday curriculum. (They have already started initial training and will enhance the training over the next year.) Utilizing a template based on a well established incident with significant resources does not work when the firefighter emergency occurs on initial assignment arrival, which, if the national statistics are correct, occurs over 80 percent of the time.

Another issue: During this incident, Command immediately defaulted to a template style of running a mayday situation not necessarily appropriate for all situations. 

Rapid-intervention training

Over the years, the SFD has aggressively trained and equipped its companies for rapid intervention. They have also aggressively addressed two-out and, by policy, clarified the difference between the two. However, in this case, a lesson learned is that they need to emphasize the need for the two-out crew to primarily be in a “rescue” mindset. In the event that the emergency occurs with only the first two engines on scene, the rapid-intervention crew (RIC) component will still be en route. The SFD has a non-negotiable policy that two-out will be established every time. The success of this incident was due in part to Engine 10 expertly putting the two-out line into play. 

Reality of firefighter rescues

Every department should reevaluate its ideas of RIC and two-out. Studies show that firefighter rescue-related emergencies are happening before the RIC is even established, yet we continue to put our faith in that RIC team. I am personally aware of many departments that don't have a designated firefighter rescue team until “they” get there and determine if that team (often a mutual-aid team) is needed. By then, it can be too late. 

Training should be based on the true reality of these "right now" emergencies. Our sterile and always successful mayday training scenarios are actually presenting firefighters with a false sense of security based on an unrealistic positive outcome.

According to the SFD leadership, certain assumptions have always been made regarding rescue techniques. Over time a culture of "I'll just employ some direct physical or mechanical technique to rescue a firefighter in trouble” has been created. However, this incident challenged those assumptions. Many of the techniques taught in Firefighter Survival training did not work during an actual, dynamic emergency. Some of the techniques were physically impossible to accomplish. Some were impractical. Fortunately, many of the personnel involved in this incident were Firefighter Survival instructors or were highly trained in these techniques. They recognized the failures and continued to employ alternate techniques and attempts, adjusting each time until a ladder technique worked. As a result of this incident and their investigation, they have identified the weakness, and department-wide hands-on training has been scheduled for February 2016 to address more realistic techniques of rescuing downed firefighters. Note: This incident involved a probationary firefighter with limited field experience operating at his first fire. This caused a lack of situational awareness during emergency procedures.

Alternative thoughts on RICs

As you read in this article, it’s important to remember that the actual rescuers may not always be the RIC team. More and more, reports are coming out stating (in brief summary) that:

• The first chance a firefighter has to be rescued is self-rescue.
• The second chance will be the firefighters who are "right there" or close to the downed firefighter.
• The next chance is the RIC team.

The traditional "we are on the way" rapid rescue team isn't always the best choice, as seen in so many cases. It's even worse when staffing is low on the first alarm. Consider the tasks you want to perform. Here are just a few:

• Size-up
• Construction type and size
• Hoselines
• Water supply
• Forced entry
• Search
• Rescue
• Command/Command support
• Rapid intervention/firefighter rescue

How many firefighters is YOUR department ensuring on the first alarm? Don't guess what you need—calculate what you need by considering the tasks. And then, when you find out that what you need isn't what you have (especially for smaller, low staffed or volunteer departments without committed staffing), it's time to look at an aggressive automatic mutual-aid program for reported structural fires. Do what’s best for your firefighters and the community—not what's best for ego-driven, anti-mutual aid nonsense. 

Some areas use a concept called "on deck." An on-deck crew (ODC) is a forward staging position located just outside the immediate fire area (aka hazard zone), distanced from but with access to an appropriate tactical entrance. Once a crew or company is assigned to the ODC position, they are expected to perform as the rapid-intervention role as their top priority—until they are given an assignment into the operations of the fire. Once they are given a task, the IC replaces them with another crew (see "on the bench" below).

The ODC is supervised either by the sector/group/division officer or company officer and they will remain on deck until assigned by the IC or sector officer. On-deck crews can be used for:

• Backup or support an operating crew or company within an assigned area
• Crew relief within an assigned area 
• Any other tactical positions as assigned 
• As a RIC unit

Consider your staging staffing. What if your incident goes to hell and resources are needed—and right now? What if you deploy your ODC or RIC team? What resources do you have right now to fill the needed spots? That's when “on the bench” comes in.

“On the bench” is really the companies that are in staging but ready to go to work just outside the operational fire scene. They are not a few blocks away. By being just outside the operational area, but with quick scene access, they can be moved to whatever task you may need within seconds—not minutes—or the many, many minutes it will take for you to:

• Determine that you need help—help that you don't have
• Call dispatch and request those extra resources
• Get those resources alerted
• See those resources turnout
• See those resources respond
• See those resources finally arrive

Consider your first-alarm assignment. Do you have enough firefighters turning out, including enough to be on deck? How about on the bench, just in case? As you've heard hundreds of times, you can always send them home once you are assured that they are not needed. 

Environmental conditions

At this incident, fog may have allowed fire to burn longer without detection and slowed response of personnel. It may have also hampered visuals upon arrival.

Mayday transmission/radio usage

Multiple mayday transmissions went unrecognized, or not clarified, by personnel on scene or responding. Specifically, the first one was almost unreadable and on the wrong TAC channel. It went unrecognized. It was transmitted by the backup firefighter from Engine 6. The second mayday by the captain from Engine 6 was initially missed by Battalion 2, but Battalion 1 thought he heard a mayday and followed up. There was some confusion initially, but a face-to-face by Battalion 1 cleared up the confusion.

A term I have shared for years is DIM-WIT: Does It Matter What I'm Transmitting? If not, stay off the radio! As my chief at the Loveland-Symmes Fire Department has been pushing, "Stay off the radio. If it's good news, we don't need to know the good news. We need the air clear for those bad news reports.”

This incident also identified a culture of personnel, other than officers, who are not comfortable voicing notable, important conditions over the radio. And this is despite these personnel having a high level of experience and situational awareness.

In sum

Discuss this incident with your department and compare it against your operations. What resources (staffing, equipment, time and distance) are ensured on your first alarm? What’s your known response? What’s the real staffing? How are your members trained to operate and communicate? What guidelines and what policies exist at your department? Does your training and day-to-day operations match your SOGs? Take time now to evaluate your predictable reality … thanks to the SFD’s proven reality.

Of special note, I encourage all readers of this article to go to www.evals.net and watch the excellent in-depth video about this fire in the "after-action" section.

Our sincere thanks to the SFD for sharing this Close Call, with specific thanks to Firefighter Alex Galang, Captain Adam McKahan (rank of firefighter at the time of this fire) and Captain Gary Pimentel of Engine Company 6, along with Firefighter Marco Mejia and Firefighter David Robinson (on the nozzle of the two-out) from Engine Company 10, as well as Battalion Chief Stan Compoginis (Battalion 2) and Battalion Chief Greg Powell (Battalion 1). 

Additional thanks go to Chief Walt White, Deputy Chief Lloyd Ogan and Captain John Clark and all members of the SFD for their assistance.