Close Calls: Close Calls Avoidance? … Put the Fire Out!

Probably one of the most personally frustrating and challenging times is when you, as a firefighter, are told to not go in to “that” structural fire. Thoughts or reactions can range from, “Well, duh, who would go in there?” to “But someone might be inside” to the simple “But we want to go in! We are aggressive interior firefighters, dammit.”

I have always subscribed to the theory that there could be someone inside a fire when it may not be obvious. There is always the possibility of a vacant home NOT being vacant (perhaps homeless people inside) or occupants who were supposed to be away but came home early.

Go or no-go decisions are made with the full understanding that while I (or we, as command officers) may be operating outside in a command or divisional role, I am sending gung-ho, alive-and-breathing firefighters interior to complete the tasks that we determine to be required. This is done while being fully cognizant that they are going where we direct them—sometimes into decent conditions, sometimes into nasty conditions and sometimes changing conditions—and we own that responsibility. 

That responsibility is often magnified when it involves automatic- or mutual-aid departments. Those runs force the questions, “Who is commanding the fire where you are sending your firefighters to operate?” and “Do they operate their scenes the same way you operate your scenes?” Regularly scheduled mutual-aid training, qualified officers (at all levels, from companies to chiefs) and common policies can minimize that concern. 

Not a personal playground

NIOSH report F-2014-18, released in July 2018, about a fire in Indiana covers a line-of-duty death (LODD) that we wrote about in this column in 2015. The incident involved a commercial structure, and based upon the size-up, heavy fire conditions, and related information and observations, there was no reason to believe anyone was inside. Command ordered a defensive operation. 

The assistant fire chief was one of three firefighters who entered side Alpha of the structure to stretch a 2½-inch hoseline to protect equipment and acetylene cylinders. Understand that the crew decided on their own to enter the structure; that was not what command had ordered. 

The crew was operating about 50 feet inside the structure and then decided to change the 2½-inch nozzle to a portable ground monitor (baby deck gun). During the changeover, one firefighter left the interior to go outside and charge the hoseline. The fire was already in the overhead truss system above the assistant fire chief and the firefighter, and the fire was concealed by the ceiling.

As the third firefighter got to the overhead door, a loud crash occurred. The truss system failed, and the ceiling and roof assembly collapsed on the assistant fire chief and firefighter. The assistant fire chief was killed immediately. The firefighter, who suffered a broken leg, was able to crawl under some equipment before being rescued by a rapid-intervention crew. 

Numerous factors were identified as contributing to this assistant chief’s tragic death, including ignoring command, lack of discipline, failed risk assessment/size-up, poor communications, working in the collapse zone, lack of a safety officer and much more, but the bottom line in what lead to this tragic and unnecessary LODD is that the assistant chief decided to go inside against the determined strategy.  

Once again this is an issue of fireground discipline. In other words, do as you are ordered. If you see something that would require you to consider doing something different, use your radio and talk to your division or command. That would be a valuable message versus some of the other unnecessary stuff we have all heard on fireground channels. 

While I believe that, generally, due to experience, training and education, along with time- and fireground-proven standards, policies and procedures, the fireground in 2018 has never been more disciplined, there is much more work to be done.

While there are many other relatively recent North American examples, the investigation of another firefighter LODD in a New York suburb recently determined that companies ignored command, there was ineffective communication among operating units, there was poor accountability, company officers were unaware as to the location of their members, and much more, ultimately resulting in an engine company “accidentally” finding the downed and unconscious firefighter of a different crew in the basement. This was unbeknownst to the company officer, command or anyone else—no one knew he was missing until they came across this downed firefighter. The firefighter who lost his life did so on the scene of, and under the command of, a mutual-aid department.  

While the collective “we” may think we have a better idea than what the commander expects and ordered, the fireground is not a democratic site where we get to do what we want. The fire scene is essentially “owned” by the incident commander (IC) and, working through division and or company officers, the job must get done as command determines and orders and with strict discipline. 

Unqualified controversy

You and I have read all kinds of articles, reports and postings about hitting fire from the inside, outside, upside down, hanging from a ceiling, sitting on a drone, from a hang glider and just about everything you can imagine. My thought on this is simple: What does command want done? 

Keeping in mind that the first-due arriving officer is command, the fire sergeant, lieutenant or captain may very well be the ones to determine what we are going to do—and that is how it is supposed to be. And when a fire department (or fire departments, in the case of today's very common automatic mutual aid, box alarms, etc.) has policies and procedures and trains based upon those policies, guidelines and procedures, the system works well, especially when coupled with disciplined firefighters, officers and chiefs. 

When we talk about the concept of “unqualified controversy,” we are talking about comments or even instruction from people who have no related command qualification and experience—people suggesting how a fire should be lead, even though they have never had the responsibility of being the IC. I have yet to find a seasoned fire commander who blindly suggests ALWAYS doing this or that. Those I know generally operate with the simple formula of:

1.    What are the conditions based upon size-up?

2.     What are my initial tactical priorities based upon the size-up?

3.     What are my resources to immediately implement the tactics?

4.     What else will be needed? 

And based upon that, the decisions/orders are transmitted and actions are taken by the fire companies.  

Training for big water

Statistically (and from reality-based knowledge), we know that we are almost always going interior, and that’s the absolute best way for us to serve those who called us—to take care of them, to take care of their loved ones, and to take care of all their stuff. There are, however, times when we either have a large volume of fire or have fire conditions that our immediate resources cannot handle with handlines. In either case, it is essential to consider BIG WATER RIGHT NOW.

I, like you, have watched both in person and through videos the issue of getting water on the fire as quickly as possible. While we hear that slogan—“put the wet stuff on the red stuff”—and appropriate philosophy from so many, there are fire departments that still cannot seem to get it right. Be it the lack of training (often the #1 issue), poor staffing, or any number of valid and non-valid reasons, fire spreads, stuff burns down and people don't always get out. Admit it or not, we could have done better—my department, your department, all our departments.

In almost every case that I have either investigated or researched, training is the solution to what went wrong at a scene—training that includes:

·       Tactical (company) training

·       Supervisory (company officer and division) training

·       Command training

You can, almost at a glance, watch a fire company on the fireground and tell if that is a crew that trains—or not. Sometimes it’s painfully obvious.

Let me reiterate: Training is the solution. Hands-on, classroom, hands-on (yes, intentionally repeated), online, as well as HANDS-ON training is the solution. And don't go whining that you don't have a training center. You have a firehouse, a parking lot and fire apparatus. Viola! You have all the needed equipment to get started.

As I was writing this column, a close friend of mine called and told me that his department conducted a multi-department drill (career departments), and it was obvious to the instructor (a chief officer) that the majority of firefighters very visibly didn't want to be there. While this article isn’t focused on motivating the “sloth” firefighters, the fact is that it is your drill, your operation and your plan. Motivate them by any means necessary. They wear the gear, they accept the paycheck and, therefore, they are expected to do what’s needed. 

Heavy water right now

A few years ago, I was sent a video from Delavan, WI, located southwest of Milwaukee. The Delavan Fire Department (DFD) is a 100 percent volunteer department that handles all fire, rescue and related services, including critical BLS EMS non-transport first response. The DFD responds to approximately 300 fire-related incidents annually in addition to the other responses. There are just over 40 members on the DFD protecting a population of approximately 9,000.

In a nutshell, the video showed a medium-size, single-family dwelling with fire throughout. It was well involved, with risk to exposures as well. As the first-due engine company arrived, their operation was, quite frankly, like watching a well-choreographed performance. It was obvious that every member on that initial-arriving engine/tanker knew what they were expected to do—and did it. They had trained for this, really trained.  

The chief arrived first and provided a clear size-up, ordering what they call a "quick water attack." The firefighter behind the officer immediately went to the top to staff the deck gun. Two 2-inch handlines were stretched off the attack engine while the deck gun was flowing. One went to the Bravo side exposure, and the other went to the Delta exposure. The Bravo line was stretched first by an officer and firefighter, the second was stretched by a third firefighter who was then joined by a captain after the deck gun operation was halted. Once the exposures were out (only a quick hit from the handlines was needed on both after it was hit by the deck gun), then the handlines went to work on mopping up the rest of the fire. (Note: Their 2-inch lines have smoothbore nozzles on them with a 1 1/8-inch tip so it flows around 300 gpm.)

A volunteer firefighter who arrived on the scene back-stretched a supply line to the hydrant, without being told to … because that's how it is done. (Remember that when you arrive on scene by privately owned vehicle, your first priority is water supply.) 

Prior to the line reaching the hydrant, the deck gun on top of the rig was hitting the main body of fire, and within one minute had the fire knocked. Crews then used handlines to mop up the fire.

Everyone knew what their role was, what the plan was, and at no time are firefighters seen wandering or freelancing. 

While they could have stretched a handline and attempted to slow the fire, they decided to kick the daylights out of it. Why not go interior? There was too much fire, and the fire was the problem, so they brought that fire under control—in one minute.

Even if there were reports of occupants, this approach was still the correct call so that the conditions would allow for possible entry and rescue. Flowing big water quickly, like any fireground operation, must be trained for with efficiency as a key goal. 

·       How fast can we get water?

·       Does the apparatus tank carry enough water to flow?

·       How long can we flow from the tank?

·       What flow will we accomplish?

·       How fast are we at tying in to the hydrant?

·       What does the balance of the crew do when the gun (deck or ground) is placed into service?

·       Does every member on the apparatus understand their specific roles?

·       Is our deck gun usable 360 around the apparatus (in other words, does a high hosebed or high cab roof block our ability to flow directly into the area needed)?  

Note: While flowing the gun isn’t an everyday task, companies must, under the direction of the company officer, be as proficient at that as any of other first-due tasks. The decision to flow an apparatus deck gun is generally either “we need it right now” or “well, this fire is not going well; we've been here a while and the fire is out of control, so let’s flow the guns.” Your preference should be to use it—deck or pre-connected ground monitor—proactively when possible and appropriate. 

Delavan structure fire

Following is another example that demonstrates that when conditions dictate it, heavy water right now is the clear solution.

It’s the summer of 2018, and once again, we find ourselves at a fire in Delavan, WI. Rest assured, 95 percent of the time, the DFD members are solid, trained and no-nonsense interior firefighters. They also understand when that approach isn’t the best option for the occupants. 

On June 9, 2018, at 4:17 a.m., the DFD was dispatched to a report of a porch on fire, with the City of Delavan, the Town of Delavan and Darien fire departments responding as part of automatic mutual aid. Police officers arrived on scene at 4:19 a.m., reporting that all occupants were out of the structure, but two dogs were still inside. There had been two people asleep in the structure when the fire started, but both self-evacuated as they were woken by a passing motorist who saw the fire.

Let’s go through the timeline of events as heavy fire on the porch extends into the two-story, lath and plaster wood/balloon-frame duplex that was built in the late-1800s. (For video, search YouTube “Delavan Fire Department Responds to Fully Involved Late Night Fire”; www.youtube.com/watch?v=oeLPERZkUhE ).

4:21 a.m.: Fire Chief Tim O’Neill arrived on scene and reported a working fire with a fully involved porch that had spread to other parts of the residence. Heavy fire was observed on the porch on the Washington Street side and fire was visible in two windows east of the porch and fire in the attic above the porch.

4:22 a.m.: Chief O’Neill ordered a re-tone for a working fire. First-due Engine 5 was in service. The chief ordered Engine 5 to employ a quick water attack with the use of their deck gun.  

4:24 a.m.: Engine 5 arrived on scene and immediately deployed the deck gun on the main body of fire. The high-volume water stream knocked down the fire in the kitchen and porch in about 20 seconds. At the same time, Engine 5 stretched a 2-inch handline to the front door and conducted a primary search. The chief did a face to face with Captain John O’Neill of Engine 5, informing him that everyone was out of the structure but two dogs were still inside. The chief also transmitted the same message over the radio to inform all units.Assistant Chief Robert Chapman from the City of Delavan took a position in sector A as operations chief, and Chief Jamie Jarosz from the Town of Delavan took a position at the A/D sector directing his companies.  

4:26 a.m.: City of Delavan Engine 3 arrived on scene and connected to a fire hydrant at 4^th and Washington streets, and stretched a second 2-inch backup handline into the structure.   

4:29 a.m.: Truck 4 arrived on scene, positioning on the 4^th Street side (front) of the structure. The main aerial ladder was set up to the roof.  

4:32 a.m.: Town of Delavan Engine 2420 arrived on scene and was ordered to lead-out from the fire hydrant at 4^th and Washington and stretch a third handline to the structure to the second floor. A fourth handline was taken off of Engine 5 for exterior knockdown.  

4:34 a.m.: A permanent water supply from a positive municipal source was established to Engine 5 and, shortly thereafter, also to Engine 2420.  

4:34 a.m.: Squad 1 and Engine 2 arrived on scene. Engine 2 was ordered to lead-out from a fire hydrant at 3^rd and Washington streets and supply Engine 3.  

4:35 a.m.: Town of Delavan Truck 2451 and Engine 2423 arrived on scene reporting to the interior of the structure.  

4:36 a.m.: Fire interior companies reported that the fire was knocked down on the first floor. Township Engine Company 2420 and Engine 3 took two lines to the second floor. 

4:49 a.m.: Two deceased dogs were recovered from the second floor.   4:53 a.m.: The Darien Fire Department arrived on scene and was sent to the roof to evaluate ventilation efforts. Shortly after, they assisted with truck company duties on the second floor.   5:09 a.m.: All companies initiated overhaul operations. 

5:23 a.m.: Assistant Chief Chapman reported the fire under control.   5:21 a.m.: The piercing nozzle from Engine 5’s Snozzle was deployed to the roof for overhaul.

View from the first-due captain

The following is a summary of the incident from Captain Tom O’Neill, who was on the first-due engine company.

On arrival, as ordered, our motor pump operator (MPO) put the engine in park and engaged the pump. The crew consisted of two captains, both with 20-plus years of service, a firefighter/MPO with seven years of service, and a firefighter with two years of service. The engine is a Pierce Quantum 2000/2000 that was put into service in 2016. It is identical in every way (for ease of operation when jumping from one engine to the next) to our other engines except that we have now added a 65-foot Snozzle to it. 

The officer in charge ordered me to the deck gun for quick water while he and the firefighter deployed 200 feet of 2-inch line with 1 1/8-inch tip smooth bore nozzle to the Alpha side of the structure.  

The fire was actually located on the Delta side of the structure. I hit the fire that was blowing out of the two kitchen windows first for two reasons:

1)     I did not yet know if there were people still inside, and I wanted to buy as much time as possible for them, even if the odds of survival were small. 

2)     I wanted to avoid disrupting the thermal layer inside the structure, and hopefully somewhat ahead of the fire.

The knockdown of the main body of fire took less than 20 seconds. That deck gun has a 1 3/8-inch stacked tip on it, so it flows about 500 gpm. I flowed for about 20 to 30 seconds, so quick water only used about 250 gallons of the 2,000 gallons of water we have on board.

After that, I joined my crew as they were about to enter the structure on the Alpha side to conduct a search and further knock down the fire on the first floor. 

Heavy smoke conditions were found initially, but horizontal ventilation helped improve this. Very little fire extension was found on the first floor past the kitchen, porch and bedroom located directly behind the porch. However, due of the balloon-frame construction, the fire had migrated to the second floor and attic.  

At one point, we pulled out of the structure and put our Snozzle into operation and used the piercing nozzle to breach the roof and extinguish the attic, which was fully involved. Initially we had a truck company on the roof, but the conditions became untenable before they could get a good vent hole.

After the attic was knocked down in a minute, companies finished extensive overhaul on the first and second floor along with the attic.

The tactic described here only works because of multiple things going on at once. Even though the deck gun was in operation, the handlines were still being stretched at the same time. There was no one playing “spectator firefighter.” Handlines are still mission-critical, especially when we have exposure problems or are planning an interior attack following the deck gun attack.

Further, all of our engines are equipped/designed with two tank-to-pump valves that, of course, give us the ability to use big water. In addition to that, our deck guns have 4-inch risers that give us great flow. We made sure that the manufacturer (Pierce) certified that these engines would flow at least 1,000 gpm out of the tank. 

My point is our vehicles and the way we designed them are one of the major reasons for our success. If this tactic is employed by other departments, an increased tank-to-pump flow may be required. Plus, maybe it will get departments to think more about how they want to design their next apparatus.  

Final thoughts from Chief Goldfeder

Certainly, the handline (1½-, 1¾- or 2-inch) is the primary tool used in attacking most fires, and because of that, we are most comfortable using it—and should be proficient with it as well. However, a well-trained and experienced officer arriving first is responsible to determine (through their size-up) exactly what the strategy will be and what tactics will be deployed. 

This doesn't happen by the “magic of getting promoted” but rather by fire officers (company officers, those who may be assigned as acting officers, and chief officers) going through initial and ongoing training in initial and ongoing size-up and command responsibilities. This applies to all structural fires, from the smallest dwelling to the largest commercial building.

A critical skill required by the first-arriving officer is to be able to quickly determine what is the best way to take care of those having the fire, be it a lifesaving and/or property-saving issue. As it relates to handlines, our ability to succeed comes down to our determination of the proper size/length, our skill in rapidly stretching the line, and our ability to get it to the best position (with consideration of where the fire is, where is it going and where will it be in the time it takes to get your line in position). 

Remember that water on the fire doesn't always mean a handline, but only your size-up can determine that. Your decision determines the right line or device (hoseline/size, portable quick-deploy ground monitor, deck gun or aerial pipe) in order to get to the potential victims, protect the victims, minimize any unnecessary risk to the members and to get the fire under control as fast as possible. 

Many have said that the best way to avoid a close call is to put the fire out as fast as possible, and that is the goal. However, there have been close calls, injuries and firefighter deaths in our history because of the failure to properly understand size-up and determine the strategy and tactics needed to get water on the fire—and sometimes that means going beyond the your standard handline. The goal in the Close Calls column is to get us all thinking about just that. 

Our sincere thanks to Delavan Fire Chief Tim O'Neill for his support and to Captain Tom O'Neill for his assistance in preparing the article and to the members of the DFD and neighboring departments who operated at these two fires.