Close Calls: ‘Routine’ Gas Leak Results in LODD

There are certain incidents in life that you remember exactly where you were when they occurred. In this case, it was an early evening, and my phone rang with a friend calling and very seriously asking, “Are you listening to Loudoun County!?” I turned on the app and heard what’s now fire service history.

Sterling, VA, Volunteer Fire Company (SVFC) Firefighter Trevor Brown gave his life in the line of duty.

My thanks to Loudoun County, VA, Combined Fire and Rescue System (LC-CFRS) Chief Keith Johnson for his assistance. Thanks also go to the officers and members of the SVFC, Loudoun County Fire and Rescue (LCFR) and all of the departments, divisions and companies that responded and were affected by this loss, including the LCFR dispatch personnel.

Our hearts go out to the families who were affected, the members who are recuperating and, particularly, the family, friends, brothers and sisters of Brown.

The incident

On Feb. 16, 2024, LC-CFRS units were dispatched to an odor of gas in a residential neighborhood. It’s important to note that this residential area, which was built in the 1950s, had no domestic gas service supply.

Crews arrived and ultimately found an outside gas leak, where they identified an underground propane tank that was on the side of a single-family dwelling that was leaking. The underground tank was installed to supply propane to a pool heater for an in-ground pool that was located in the back yard. No propane was supplied to the house.

Firefighters assessed the situation, confirmed a propane leak and upgraded the call, requesting a hazmat team, including other companies and a battalion chief. The members evacuated the occupants of the house. Shortly thereafter, a catastrophic explosion occurred, which leveled the home and trapped several firefighters in burning debris.

Firefighters trapped

Two firefighters entered the home just before the explosion to get two residents to leave the basement, and the residents complied.

A firefighter, who was equipped with a PASS device and whose SCBA was running out, was trapped. The firefighter cupped his hands and threw the water that was accumulating in the basement at the fire, but with no success.

“I don’t know if you’re hearing this. I’m having trouble getting out,” the firefighter spoke over the radio. “I keep getting a [radio] bonk. I’m still trapped. I got about a third of my SCBA air left. I’m underneath quite a bit of debris right now. I’m just going to relax and try and control my breathing. I’m going to activate my PASS. I am unable to copy any of your traffic.”

The firefighter saw a small tunnel opening, took off his helmet and SCBA, and wormed through the opening. The firefighter then used his personal cutters to cut his lapel microphone cord, which allowed him to free himself.

A second firefighter began to tunnel upward through the debris and removed his facemask “just to get some air in.” After making progress, the firefighter’s lower left leg and ankle became trapped. “Mayday, mayday, mayday,” he radioed. “Please come help.”

Firefighters lowered a ladder to him, and he was extricated and hospitalized.

Eleven firefighters, including one from Fairfax County, were injured in the fire, with three incapacitated on scene. One of the firefighters who was trapped under debris in the basement narrowly escaped burning to death. Of the 10 Loudoun firefighters who were injured, four have not returned to firefighting duty.

Brown was outside of the structure when he was killed instantly by debris from the explosion.

The report: an overview

Immediately following the incident, Johnson established a significant incident team (SIT) that was led by Chief Thomas Coe of neighboring Frederick County, MD, Division of Fire & Rescue Services. The SIT consisted of 14 internal and external stakeholders and subject matter experts. They were to gather all information on the incident and identify both strengths and weaknesses in adherence to local and regional operational protocols. The report contains a comprehensive review and analysis of factors, actions and other items surrounding this incident and recommendations that are aimed at enhancing future response efforts.

Areas of concern

“Key indicators were ignored” during the initial assessment of the incident, compromising the safety of firefighters. Firefighters were caught off guard when the leak led to an explosion.

Unit officers didn’t immediately evacuate the area despite elevated gas readings from atmospheric monitors. Following the incident, personnel recalled thinking that the lower explosive limits were very high and that they shouldn’t have been in or around the structure, the report notes. “Specifically, the atmospheric monitoring devices were alarming with elevated readings, and the levels did not seem consistent with the conditions. Members provided varying reports on the presence of a gas odor.”

The incident commander (IC) was unaware initially that two firefighters entered the home to search for an occupant in the basement, and there was a “clear struggle to establish and maintain accountability of on-scene personnel.”

During the search, checks weren’t made on the location of other firefighters. The gravity of this fact is amplified by the post-incident discovery that two separate members were at one point partially submerged in the in-ground pool.

The failure to initially establish accountability and document the location of the members who were operating on scene was compounded by the lack of an initially organized command structure and the failure of units on the second and later alarms to establish and report to staging on arrival.

It’s important to note that the responding battalion chief who became the IC of this event arrived post-explosion, finding a house that exploded, one deceased firefighter and nine others injured, two of whom were trapped and calling maydays.

There were multiple communications problems. These included the mobile data computers continually refreshing, so firefighters were unable to read what was on the screens. Cross-jurisdictional CAD wasn’t fully available to automatic-aid responders, and some responding units missed the initial maydays and were trying to piece together the incident via radio traffic in real time.

A lack of command and control after firefighters were released from the scene to a central meeting place for a behavioral health assessment by Loudoun’s behavioral health clinicians and peer support team caused many of them to become “confused, angry and frustrated.”

The report recommended that a senior officer be assigned to coordinate the task of finding a meeting place after a serious incident.

The report praised firefighters for their “unwavering courage and resilience” but noted that there was a need for “continuous improvement” in communication, emergency response protocols and training to reduce risk. This applies to any department.

Incident/report overview

Risk assessment. Key indicators weren’t understood fully during the initial and ongoing size-ups, which compromised the safety of on-scene personnel.

Event escalation. The incident escalated from a routine outside gas leak call to a catastrophic explosion, which caught responders off guard.

Communication challenges. There were delays in relaying critical information and confusion regarding mayday calls, which affected the effectiveness of response efforts.

Resource allocation. There were issues with resource allocation and coordination, particularly in regard to ensuring an adequate water supply and managing the rescue operation of trapped personnel.

Command structure. The command structure faced challenges in managing the complex and rapidly evolving situation, which led to difficulties in coordinating rescue efforts and patient treatment/transport and in ensuring scene accountability.

There were key factors that favorably affected incident outcomes. These findings include:

Training. LC-CFRS requires firefighter mayday training as part of the Firefighter I and Firefighter II curriculum. Each of the trapped members credited this training to their life being saved. Prior to the incident, telecommunicators from the LCFR Emergency Communications Center (LCFR-ECC) participated in mayday training that helped to prepare them for the intricacies that are involved in firefighter rescue operations.

LCFR-ECC management and coordination. The LCFR-ECC staff worked diligently to manage and track radio communications throughout the incident and ensured that the IC was provided with the information in a timely manner.

Technical rescue expertise. Two technical rescue units, one from Loudoun County’s Kincora Station and the other from Fairfax County’s North Point Station, arrived quickly and used their extensive training to rapidly develop a victim removal plan and executed that plan in a coordinated effort.

The findings apply to every firefighter, officer, chief and department, everywhere.

Comments from Goldfeder

The report certainly underscores the need for continuous improvement in policy and protocols, training and communication strategies to manage risks and enhance the safety of responders and the survivability of civilians in everything from “daily” incidents to those of this caliber—which grow from “daily.” This applies to every fire service organization, and it’s incumbent upon leadership to use this report as a template for their agency.

When discussing this incident, it made me remember a few decades ago when “incident command” was starting to show its value. Many were reluctant or even criticized the need for a command structure on seemingly minor incidents The report—and this incident—demonstrates the critical need for command to be established on every incident, so if/when needed, it can be built upon. It also highlights the consideration that command might be “working”—and not in a “fixed” position, such as a company officer—when things take a terrible turn.

“We must continue to learn from past incidents to continue to support our fire and EMS personnel, provide for the health and well-being of our firefighters, and support legislative initiatives that improve the safety of our profession,” Johnson states.

Involuntary manslaughter

In October 2024, according to multiple news reports, a former Southern States Cooperative service technician, Roger Lee Bentley, was charged with felony involuntary manslaughter and unlawful transfer of hazardous material, unlawful release of hazardous material, failure to maintain required records of hazardous materials release and failure to control or mitigate unauthorized discharge of hazardous materials, which are misdemeanors.

One news report also indicated that Southern States first became aware of problems with the tank in 2021. Bentley’s trial has been scheduled to begin July 7, 2025.