Despite what some “pundits” may pronounce in print, video or on talk shows, jihadists tend to do what they know best. Looking at the full spectrum of attacks, both domestic and foreign, the pattern is very clear. We can prepare for a full spectrum CBERN attack, or we can prepare for what is most likely going to happen.
What’s most likely to occur is a gun, bomb or incendiary attack, or a combination of those.
The follow on to this, training for these incidents is "perishable." One exposure to any element of a CBERN-based attack does not confirm immunity or competence to the agencies who have received the training. The second follow on is that every locale in the U.S. does not share the same risk profile. People in Wyoming don’t need preparations for hurricanes, and people in Hawaii do not need training for blizzards.
Responder Expectations
Over the last few decades, public safety's area of responsibility has expanded dramatically, whether you are fire, police or EMS. We all confront new challenges ranging from climate change (giant storms or heat waves) to mass casualty events and terrorism.
When we respond to emergencies we have to make rapid decisions and we rely on known frames of reference, including training and experience. These are called heuristic responses or “rule of thumb” decision making; they are automatic and function "in the background."
Let me introduce a concept called “base conditions.” Base conditions are what you expect based on responses you have been on before. Take for instance an active shooter, this will involve police, fire and EMS for control and resolution. Everyone has some frame of reference to this situation. What if it isn’t one shooter, but two? One targeting the victims, and one targeting the responders. This is an example of a "complex attack" (see below for a definition of a complex attack).
Back to base conditions, you have several expectations that should be established immediately. This should start with dispatch information. Here are a few examples that should immediately change your response pattern.
While responding to shots fired, you hear many shots fired, many victims, possible explosion. Every element increases in complexity. If a shot spotter is installed you should get an indication if more than one weapon is in use. What difference does it make if dispatch says over 100 rounds fired? That’s one element of base conditions.
What if an EMS response to a sick person in a subway becomes two sick people? Before you enter the subway, a bus driver approaches and says he has two people sick on his bus. Someone sitting outside on a bench says they're also feeling sick. Then you notice a bird dying by the entrance of the subway. A coincidence? What do base conditions tell you? If this is a terrorist attack, a heuristic approach might fail in a catastrophic way.
Information Can Prevent Deadly Outcomes
In a complex terrorist attack, your first error might be your last.
If dispatch provides further information, and you approach the scene like we do so many times in “automatic” mode, it might be the first step in the event going sideways. That means your first move at the scene of an emergency ends up being wrong, the difficulty of correcting the error grows with time and the complexity of the incident. All it takes is the wrong initial position, coming in from downwind, blocking access or egress, etc.
No dispatch system can accurately describe a dynamic situation. Dispatch can only tell you the information that comes in via radio or telephone and only the first unit on the scene can add to the information you learn over the radio.
It’s difficult to get here, and our government surveillance is the best in the world, right? That’s why we haven't suffered another major attack again. Our successful response to a terrorist attack depends on training, equipment, coordination and the type of attack we face. If you think we’ll get notified, then you should think again. According to the Economist’s January 17, 2015 edition, our ability to successfully detect an impending attack is “going dark.”
What we have been able to foil so far are described as complex attacks that we do not train for, and haven’t experienced anywhere near the level that is possible. By the definition below, we haven’t had one, yet.
They have, however, happened overseas.
A Definition of the Complex Terrorist Attack
What is a complex terrorist attack? And, if we face one, how do we recognize it rapidly?
Complex attacks across the world look like this: A group of two or more terrorists working together who have experience, training or expert guidance where the threat or attack has two or more elements, (bomb, incendiary device, firearms, booby traps, etc.). By design, it requires multiple public resources to respond, and in a sustained way, has elements to make suppression more difficult. Those include difficult access, diversionary tactics, secondary explosives, or snipers. The timing and location will have maximum press coverage of the terror element and victims.
If an event occurs during rush hour, at a choke point, it involves elements like smoke, incendiaries and seems to have an unusual presentation. Your index of suspicion should go up according to how many elements are present.
This type of attack will require close cooperation between all responding agencies, especially public safety. So, how’s your interoperability really going? If your answer is, we have a common channel, and we’ve had a drill or two, you are not prepared enough.
If this sounds familiar, it should. This was the attack perpetrated on Mumbai, India in 2008. More than 175 people were killed and several hundred were injured by a small number of attackers. What was different in this attack was the use of cell phones and public media to direct their operations making the suppression of this attack more difficult. The perpetrators, through the use of a cell phone calls to handlers in Pakistan, were advised of the situation on the ground by watching the attack and response on television and social media.
Here in America, our attacks seem to be simple by definition, and often employ one gunman. In the case of the Charlie Hebdo attack in Paris, it was two gunmen.
This illustrates the entire point of the article, how much time and money do we spend preparing for chemical, biologic, nuclear and radiologic attacks, and how likely are they?
Where Are The Greatest Risks?
For those who plan out the attacks, speed and the ability to pass unrecognized is at the top of the list. Is it easier to attack Duluth, MN, or Kansas City, or would you avoid the middle of the county for no better reason than the effort needed to get there. This is the question we need to apply to foreign-born or foreign-trained terrorist elements. They enter at the edge of a port city, a city with lots of tourists, perhaps a mix of business travelers or where a few dignitaries or government representatives may be. In short, a place with trains, planes and boats and lots of people to watch.
What Does History Tell Us?
According to the Heritage Foundation’s data analysis center, there were 211 attacks foreign and domestic between 1970 and 2014. Their conclusion is that attacks within the continental U.S. are on a significant downward trend.
The Global Terrorism Data Base, indicates that out of 113,000 recorded attacks since 1970, terrorists used explosives 50.73% of the time, firearms 37.76% of the time, and incendiary devices 8.23% of the time. That is a total of 96.72% of the time. Of the remaining seven categories, radiologic attack was 0.01% and biologic .03%.
I should note that 13% of terrorist attacks are on police, usually for symbolic reasons and tend to be effective at producing terror, even if foiled. How many police departments train and design facilities in the U.S. to thwart such attacks, let alone fire stations or other critical infrastructure? How many police or fire stations in the U.S. can you pull right up too?
Today, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) is the top of the heap for using media and the Internet, including, texting and mobile platforms to transmit encrypted battle plans and other information. Anything you and I can learn, train on, or question is on the Internet is also available to terrorist organizations or "lone wolf" attackers.
With this in mind, why then do we publicly display our problems, issues and training that might be sensitive? One example was D.C. Fire and EMS’s trouble in dealing with a fire in their subway. Their problems are now available to the world. What is the training or response advantage to listing our weak points worldwide?
Training Facilities in the U.S.
For those who might not know about Homeland Security training available, here’s a comprehensive list.
- National Domestic Preparedness Consortium (NDPC) — The domestic training effort is led by the NDPC and is the primary federal training delivery system for the U.S.
- Center for Domestic Preparedness (CDP) — Offers 45 different topics and is the only venue for live agent training.
- The Energetic Materials Research and Testing Center (EMRTC) — Offers courses on explosives including incendiaries.
- National Center for Biomedical Research and Training (NCBRT) — Offers training similar to the CDP, without chemical weapons training.
- National Emergency Response and Rescue Training Center (NERRTC) — Delivers general course work for first and second responders.
- Nevada Test Site’s Counter Terrorism Operations Support Program (NTS/CTOS) — Prevention of radiological and nuclear WMD for a variety of disciplines.
- Transportation Technology Center, Inc. (TTCI) — The focus is on surface transportation security and emergency response training.
- National Disaster Preparedness Training Center (NDPTC) — The focus is on island communities and recovery from catastrophes.
What's Really Needed For An Effective Response?
First, any training we do has a shelf life; the knowledge and skills are perishable.
Since most agencies are not all single agencies in the United States, some method of choreographing a real response to a real incident is a start (remember interoperability?). Part of this is a real, functioning interoperability system. This must include so called “second responders” as well, hospitals, cities, counties and state authorities must have some way of accessing real-time information. Without this capability, response effectiveness will be determined after the incident. Too late for many, including us.
Interoperability and Its Many Meanings
- Not running into each other on the way to the incident.
- Knowing each other’s location in real time.
- Multi-jurisdictional pre-plans for likely and soft targets.
- Operational flexibility that all players are intimately familiar with.
- Using common terminology language and tactics, not separate incident command systems for police, EMS and fire
- Immediate local, regional and state awareness.
- Mobilization of additional resources ahead of demand.
- Keeping other resources informed, such as hospitals, public health, media etc.
- And lastly, it means not destroying evidence and keeping a trained eye at all times.
Remember, there is no situation that you cannot make worse by something you do or do not do.
JEFF RUSTEEN has over 30 years in the fire service in both small and large urban fire departments as a firefighter/paramedic, officer and dispatch supervisor. Rusteen has responded to several major incidents, including the Oakland Hills Firestorm and the Loma Prieta Earthquake and he has been involved in the planning and response to regular mass gatherings when he was with the San Francisco Fire Department. His instructional experience includes both teaching and curriculum development for both college courses and private instruction for more than 25 years.
