Close Calls: ‘Gas’-Related Suicide Run—A Deadly Outcome Avoided

On the morning of Sept. 1, 2020, the Loveland-Symmes Fire Department (Loveland, OH) was dispatched on an EMS run for a possible suicide that had “gas” involved. Natural gas or gasoline wasn’t specified nor known at the time. Deputy Chief Mike Books arrived and established command. He had the paramedic ambulance stage at a nearby church and had a fire/gas-leak run dispatched, too. Books noted that he initially staged the units because: communications (Northeast Communications Center) advised that the subject had a long history of firearms use; the gas potential; and it was a crime-related run. Communications further advised that the subject had pumped “gas” into an automobile, and there was a possible dead on arrival. 

The police initially said that a heavy smell of gasoline was coming from the automobile. Books and the EMS crew were about 15 feet away from the automobile when they encountered the heavy smell of natural gas; they saw a garden hose coming from the automobile and going into the house. That is when Books upgraded the run to a fire/gas call. The local natural gas provider was notified, and the Loveland-Symmes members who were on scene immediately evacuated the house, which was occupied by family and friends of the subject. Books also ordered the police away from the back of the house, evacuated the neighboring house and closed the street for about a block.

Quint 63 Capt. John Eadicicco responded, and Books advised by radio that it was natural gas—not gasoline—that was involved.

Crews who were on scene could smell natural gas from the exterior of the building. Once on scene and prior to entry, Eadicicco, as directed, secured the natural gas main on the Alpha side of the residence. The crew packed up with their SCBA and tools and investigated. They found the natural gas was leaking from the gas fireplace that was inside of the structure. Readings showed 3.1 percent of the lower explosion limit (LEL).

The crew discovered that natural gas was being fed to a garden hose from the fireplace through the lower level of the home, out the garage and to the automobile, which was in the driveway in the rear of the structure. It later was determined that the deceased made this intricate “system” using tape and glue to ensure a flow of gas.

When members approached the automobile (Charlie side near Bravo side), the driver door was open (previously by the police), and there was a very strong smell of natural gas around the automobile. This was because of the use of the garden hose to flow the gas into the automobile. The members “vented” the automobile by opening it; they also used a fan to assist because of the weather. Once the readings were lowered, fire-medics affirmed the victim status per protocol. The victim was confirmed dead on arrival in the driver’s seat of the automobile.

The gas meter valve (in the fireplace, feeding the garden hose) was turned off by Quint 63, which stopped the flow of natural gas inside of the structure. Ventilation of the structure by positive pressure was conducted. When crews rechecked the structure, they received zero readings throughout it.

The crews used a 5-gas monitor and a Sensit natural gas leak detector. Natural gas was concentrated in the Alpha/Bravo living room where the hose was connected to the fireplace. The entire structure, including the basement and second floor, was checked using both monitors. No readings were found outside of the room of origin. The highest reading was the previously noted 3.1 percent of the LEL, which they were able to positively pressure ventilate. Some difficulty was encountered ventilating, because windows and doors either were painted shut or didn’t operate properly.

Eadicicco noted that the MultiRAE gas monitor didn’t show any abnormal readings throughout the structure: O2 20.9 percent LEL 0 ppm, VOC 0 ppm, H2S 0 ppm, CO 0 ppm. The automobile had 3.0 percent of the LEL before ventilation.

The natural gas provider arrived on scene and was advised of the situation. One of the company’s crew, in coordination with firefighters, put a plug in the main to prevent any natural gas from getting into the structure.

Comments from Chief Goldfeder

Early in my career, natural gas leaks didn’t seem to be taken seriously. The image of the natural gas company employee arriving on scene of a natural gas break with a lit cigarette in his mouth remains etched in my mind. Plus, in those days, we didn’t have the detection devices that we have today. Of course, the risk was the same. Gas blows up. Never underestimate the potential. Treat it as a problem until it no longer is.

If you spent any time studying this job, you know and understand that gas leaks must be taken seriously for the simple reason that leaks can become explosions and kill civilians and firefighters.

The gas itself, even without ignition, is a life-threatening danger—as found on this run. The attempted suicide by gas was successful. However, the means by which the life was taken created a danger to the community, law enforcement and, of course, the responding firefighters-paramedics. Although many gas leaks are accidental, this was an intentional act. Furthermore, although not the case on this run, there have been situations when the victim intentionally created an environment that would end his/her own life and cause harm to responding fire and police personnel.

The common denominator in allowing us to respond and to help people, be it victims or “people exposures” in a scenario such as this, is size-up. Size up to determine what the problem is and how it can be stopped from doing what it’s doing—and from getting worse. Use whatever your department policy dictates for your size-up, which should include:

• The building (or in this case a large dwelling, the affiliated vehicle as well as exposures)
• Conditions (fire, smell and civilian or police reports as well as however much information that your dispatcher can ascertain or provide); in this case, a neighbor went to check on the occupant, discovered the scene and called 9-1-1
• Occupancy, life hazard (victim/potential victims or exposures)
• Layout, arrangement of the scene, the building, exposures and access to get in—and to get out
• Resources (to handle the immediate problem as well as what might become a worse situation; essentially, ask yourself, “If it blows up now, do I have adequate resources to handle the problem, including the rescue of members who now might become victims?”)
• Other factors, such as time of day, weather and other hazards

With the discovery that the victim was deceased, the run became a gas emergency. In that case, follow your department’s policy. For example:

• Scan with a gas monitor, with everyone using PPE
• Have an engine company establish water supply outside of the immediate danger zone
• Make sure that the monitor that you use keeps up with your advancement into the suspected area; in other words, don’t outrun the meter: let it do its job and react based on the readings
• Secure the area of all nonfirefighting, nonPPEed personnel; that must include civilians and law enforcement, who might need to remain in a “Cold” zone for their own safety until the fire department determines that the scene is secure
• As in any run, companies/personnel must be managed; freelancing is absolutely unacceptable
• Stage nonessential personnel and companies; quite frankly, by doing that, if there is an explosion, you limit the exposed members
• Identify all potential sources of ignition, including electrical sources
• Secure the sources as determined based on conditions
• Keep in mind that if gas monitor readings are above the high explosive limit, ventilation will lower it to a fuel-and-air mixture within the explosive range; be prepared for that potential and manage it
• Vent the applicable areas and continue to monitor identified areas

At this run, although the police did approach the victim’s vehicle, they initially were unaware of the actual situation, which was the high levels of natural gas. When they opened the automobile door, the gas flow and the deceased victim were obvious immediately. The police cleared the area and staged to allow the firefighters to secure the gas.

Upon arrival, Books, using available information, immediately upgraded the incident from an EMS run to a fire/gas-leak incident, bringing a fire response, which then brought the situation under control.

To learn is to honor

We always learn about incidents that remind us about how serious our own incidents can become. Training should be consistent in all areas of potential response for any fire department, but we can learn from bad things that happen.

I always will remember the summer of 2018. Sun Prairie, WI, Fire & Rescue Company Capt. Cory Barr was killed in the line of duty. Workers for a private contractor punctured a four-inch gas main in a commercial area, which caused a leak that eventually resulted in an explosion. Barr, who was leading evacuations, was killed.

Following an investigation, the state Public Service Commission determined that the drilling company violated state law when it failed to contact the state’s underground utility location service before starting work. The workers struck an underground gas line while boring a hole for fiber-optic cable that was being installed. At some point, a source of ignition caused the massive explosion.

What I remember most about that incident was seeing the video. When I see the power of that explosion, it is a grim reminder of just how badly any gas-related emergency can become—and what we must do to minimize it. Take time to watch the video (firehouse.com/lodds/news/21012879/sun-prairie-wi-fire-captain-killed-in-gas-explosion-firefighters) to gain solid perspective of what can happen and to honor and learn from the ultimate sacrifice of Barr.