Close Calls: Firefighters Avoid Huge Hole in Floor

On May 8, 2017, around 12 p.m., the Tinley Park, IL, Fire Department (TPFD) was dispatched to a reported dwelling fire. Like all responses, this incident had the potential for a negative ending—courtesy of a gaping hole in the kitchen floor—but it didn't happen that way.

How it could have happened

Recently, in another area of the country, a dwelling fire claimed the life of a firefighter in similar conditions. As identified by investigators, so much went wrong. And as we should all know by now, so much of what goes wrong is predictable. Some of the issues at that fire included:

• Lack of crew integrity/freelancing
• Ineffective span of control
• Ineffective personnel accountability system
• Lack of an assigned rapid intervention/on-deck crew (in this case, the crew ignored their assignment and proceeded to freelance)
• Lack of training or coordination between automatic and mutual-aid fire departments
• Ineffective or lacking scene communications and incompatible radio frequencies
• Crews failing to follow orders
  

Plus, there was a burned hole in the first-floor foyer above the fire. Some interior crews were aware of the hole but didn't pass on that info, meaning some firefighters were unaware of the hazard. Not long after that, a firefighter fell through the hole and was eventually found unconscious by a crew that was unaware he was even there. That firefighter died in the hospital a few days later. 

This month’s Close Call incident in Illinois gives us all an opportunity to consider how a disciplined and coordinated scene can lead to a positive outcome, even with a hole in the floor.

About the TPFD

Located in the metropolitan Chicago area, the Village of Tinley Park has a population of approximately 60,000. The Village is 16 square miles in size and is divided by Interstate 80.

The department is uniquely designed to meet the needs of Village residents with a part-time, paid-in-place firefighting team that works diligently to ensure smooth operations in four Village fire stations situated throughout the community. In 2016, the department responded to more than 8,500 calls for service, including 2,690 fire-related responses. The department is currently rated as ISO Class 3.

In-service daily are two engines, one truck (aerial), one tower ladder, one shift commander and five contractual service ambulances. Staffing levels are 15 per day plus the 10 contract EMS paramedics who are not firefighters. 

The department’s operations are comprised of four divisions: Personnel, Operations, Maintenance and Training. The department staff consists of approximately 150 members, including the full-time fire chief and four full-time staff members. Additionally, there are part-time paid deputy chiefs, assistant chiefs, captains, lieutenants, inspectors, clerical assistants and the firefighters. The Fire Prevention Bureau is a nationally recognized and accredited agency.

The initial response

A Still Alarm (the initial dispatch for a dwelling fire) came in at 11:54 a.m., sending Engines 47 and 49; Truck 46; Tower 48; Ambulance 146; Battalion 46; Chiefs 4600, 4601, 4603; and automatic aid in the form of Orland Truck 1 and Battalion 2. A Working Fire Dispatch was called at 12:11 p.m., sending Oak Forest Engine 40, Mokena Engine 93, Oak Forest Chief 3901 and Orland Ambulance 2. 

Incident summary

The first units arrived on the scene of a two-story, wood-frame, single-family dwelling on fire at 11:57 a.m. Battalion 46 passed Command to Deputy Chief 4601, and Battalion 46 assumed Operations.

The initial size-up indicated smoke showing from the roof and attic soffits; however, the fire was ultimately found in multiple locations. Crews engaged in forcible entry, extinguishment, search and ventilation activities in a coordinated manner. One of the keys to this incident was the identification of a hole in the floor from the basement—information that was shared with all members on scene.

Let’s review the incident through the eyes of several crewmembers on scene that day: Engine 47’s Lt. Jim Wooten for whom this incident was his first working fire as a lieutenant; Lt. Shawn Richards of Truck 46, the first-arriving truck; Assistant Chief Dan Reda, the shift commander on Battalion 46; and Assistant Chief Kris Dunn, who served as the safety officer. Each section offers a snapshot into the actions of the individuals and crews assigned to this incident, underscoring the coordinated nature of the response.

From Lt. Wooten – Engine 47

Upon arrival, Engine 47 conducted a partial size-up of the structure, noting dark brown smoke showing from the Bravo side first-floor, which was open approximately 4 to 6 inches, along with smoke showing from the roof vents and eaves on the second floor. (The 360 was later completed by Lt. Richards on Truck 46, which arrived right behind Engine 47.) There was no fire showing on the exterior of the home. 

Engine 47 stretched a 1¾-inch crosslay to the front door, which was locked. Truck 46 and Engine 47 forced entry to begin a primary search and fire extinguishment. The initial body of fire was found in the entryway closet. Engine 47 notified Command that they had water on the fire.

On further search of the first floor, a thermal imaging camera showed the presence of a 6-foot x 6-foot hole that had burned through the kitchen floor. I radioed that there was a hole in floor to the incident commander (IC), Deputy Chief Steve Klotz, who notified Chief Reda, who broadcast this information on radio to all crew operating on scene. 

Extinguishment then moved to the kitchen area and down to the basement for fire attack. Crews found fire in the floor joist area for the first floor. On investigation of the basement, it was found that the sprinkler head in the utility area had activated. (Local ordinance requires a sprinkler head to be located in the furnace and hot water area tied to a domestic water supply system.) 

Engine 47 opened the basement windows for ventilation. Once the fire in this area was extinguished, Engine 47 exited the building and was reassigned to the second floor to assist with overhaul.

From Lt. Richards – Truck 46

Upon arrival, Truck 46 positioned facing eastbound in front of the building. Upon my initial 360 size-up, I noticed smoke from the roof vents, smoke from the eves, melted blinds on the second floor and smoke-filled windows on the first floor. 

I order my crew to split up in crews of two—exterior and interior. My driver and firefighter behind him were given the order to set the aerial to the roof and ventilate the roof as soon as possible. The second firefighter and I acquired tools for forcible entry and primary search.

I met Lt. Wooten of Engine 47 at the front door, and we agreed on the extent of the fire to the attic. We then forced the front door to find heavy smoke to the floor with a medium push of air upon opening the door. 

The Truck 46 interior crew entered the front door and began a primary search of the first floor, which was negative. Upon searching, we were notified of a hole in the kitchen floor and that we may have a basement fire. We followed the initial engine crew to the basement for primary search. The basement primary was negative, and we proceeded to the second floor for primary, which was also negative.

Once primary was completed, we aligned back up with Engine 47’s crew and provided ventilation and investigation for extension of the initial fire. 

Truck 46’s exterior crew was reassigned by operations once the initial roof assignment was complete. We followed extension of the fire to the second floor and met Tower 48’s crew and assisted with horizontal ventilation until the second floor became clearer and the temperature dropped. Once conditions got better, we left the building and were assigned to rehab. 

From Assistant Chief Reda – Battalion 46

Upon arrival on scene, Battalion 46 confirmed Engine 47's size-up and gave a radio report stating that it appeared the fire may be in the attic or second floor, and we were leading out and to switch all responding companies to RED fireground on arrival. (A RED fireground in our tactical channel is used once companies arrive on scene and a fixed IC is in place to monitor it; this keeps routine dispatch traffic off the tactical operation channel.)

Deputy Chief 4601 advised that he was approaching the scene and asked if he wanted me to have him take Operations. I stated he should assume Command, and I would take Operations.

Battalion 46 got dressed and met Engine 47's crew along with the Truck 46 interior team at the front door. Engine 47's officer said they were getting a hit on the fire and that it was in the basement. They stated that there was a hole in the kitchen floor, but they were able to hit the fire from there. Truck 46's officer stated that he was conducting a primary on the first floor and was going to attempt to make it to the second floor. 

The Truck 46 exterior team was making the roof. Tower 48's crew came up to the on-deck position, and I had their interior crew go with Truck 46's to search the second floor and report on conditions. The Truck 48 exterior team went to Charlie sector with a 24-foot ladder to assess the situation. They put up ladders and took out windows for ventilation.

Chief 4601 called for the working fire response and asked if we needed a Box Alarm, which would have brought an even heavier response, but I stated we will be able to hold it with the current resources. 

Truck 46's officer came back down and stated it was hot up on the second floor and that we needed to vent. He then told me that we still had fire on the first floor. At that time, I asked Engine 49 to deploy a second 1¾-inch line and they went to work on the first floor. 

Tower 48’s officer, Lt. Jim Gaskill, radioed that he needed a line upstairs as well as ventilation in the master bedroom directly above the fire on the first floor. The crew also began to open the ceiling, looking for extension into the attic, but nothing was found. 

Truck 46's officer stated that he and Engine 49 had the bulk of the first-floor fire knocked, and then Engine 47's officer stated they had the fire in the basement knocked.  

I had Engine 49 re-position its line to the second floor, and then had Truck 46's exterior team vent the second-floor bedroom on the Alpha side. This was done and conditions improved.

Chief 4603 was now on the second floor as well and radioed that we were getting a good knock on the fire.

When Mokena Engine 93 and Oak Forest Engine 40 arrived, they were sent on-deck to Alpha. Orland Ambulance 2 was assigned as Rehab. Orland Tower 1 was assigned on-deck in Alpha Division and was initial RIT. Orland Battalion 2 was assigned to Charlie division. 

From Assistant Chief Dunn – Safety Officer

While performing a 360, I noticed stained windows with melted window blinds on the second floor and other signs of a ventilation-limited fire, including a unidirectional flow path from a rear patio door that had been vented by interior crews. 

I met the Tower 48 exterior crew in the rear as they were laddering the Charlie side and preparing for ventilation on the second floor. At this point, the primary search found fire burned through the first and second floor with high heat conditions on the second floor.

Battalion 46 assigned a line to the second floor, and I followed it up to assess the conditions of the second floor and the hole that had burned through the floor up there. As the line was put in play, Lt. Richards of Truck 46 and his interior crew vented the windows, and Tower 48's interior crew aggressively worked to open the ceiling. The attic was found to be clear. 

Orland Truck 1, Mokena Engine 93 and Tinley Engine 49 (after recycle) came in to finish the overhaul and secondary search of the second floor. Chief 4603 called the second-floor assignments complete and recycled with no other assignment to follow.

From Chief Goldfeder

Following are my observations and comments based on my discussions with Forest Reeder, chief of the TPFD. 

There were several significant elements in this incident:

• The initial size-up of an attic fire transitioned to a basement fire attack operation upon entry into structure.
• The use of a TIC allowed crews to locate 6 x 6 hole in kitchen floor that could have resulted in firefighters falling through the floor and into the basement.
• The sprinkler head in the basement utility room activated and may have played a role in limiting fire growth.
• It was later determined that a water line in the ceiling (below the point of origin) broke, allowing water to spray in the area of origin, which may have limited fire growth.
• Only one window on the Bravo first floor was open 4 to 6 inches at the time of the fire, meaning the limited air flow may have created a ventilation-limited fire, limiting fire growth.

So why no headlines or NIOSH reports? It’s actually pretty simple: The TPFD was prepared to respond to a modern-day dwelling fire. They understood what had gone wrong at other similar fires across North America, and they took the time to learn so they could be better prepared well before the run comes in. Unfortunately, there are examples of fire departments responding in 2017 but using fireground operations as if it is 1960. 

The TPFD also experienced some significant change prior to this fire. Well-respected veteran Chief Ken Dunn, who served the department for more than 40 years, with 20 as the chief, retired in March. The Village’s leaders had just appointed their new chief, Forest Reeder. In some organizations, this may have created some problems, administratively as well as on the fireground. In this case, it didn't. “The orchestra kept on playing regardless of who was leading!”

The fire went as expected based upon the prior training, structure, operations and all levels of TPFD leadership. With due respect, it really didn’t matter who was serving as the chief because they have numerous “systems” in place to ensure the public is best served.

Let’s consider the issues we noted at the beginning of this article, related to a recent and very tragic firefighter line-of-duty death, and how they apply to the TPFD incident: 

Lack of crew integrity/freelancing: This was not an issue at this fire, as companies had clear assignments, crews stayed together and assignments were accomplished. 

Ineffective span of control: Every crew had an officer, and there were enough other additional responding chief and staff officers to provide for the staffing of divisional supervisors and operations support. 

Ineffective personnel accountability system: There are some departments where operating without knowing where every crewmember is and what their assignments are is a thing of the past. This is one of those cases. A simple question that should always be asked to any officer or IC is: “Where is [fill in the blank] crew and what are they doing?” The answer should be simple, immediate and with absolute confidence. 

Lack of an assigned rapid intervention/on-deck crew: Every first-alarm assignment where firefighters will be operating in an immediately dangerous to life and health (IDLH) hazard zones requires a trained crew to be ready to perform firefighter rescue. Some fire departments have experienced situations where a crew assigned to rapid intervention or on-deck doesn't want to do that—so they do something else. And when that happens, it is clear that there is no sense of training, policy, discipline or respect. It shouldn't take any command officer more than 5 seconds to get rid of any crew refusing an assignment. Send them on a one-way trip home. 

Fireground assignments are not based upon a democratic vote; they are based upon the dictatorial need as determined by the IC. In the TPFD incident, there was no question who was assigned what—and they did it. 

Lack of training or coordination between automatic and mutual-aid fire departments: Departments cannot respond with one another on a regular basis without common training, equipment and operational guidelines. When auto or regular mutual aid is common, it is incumbent of the organizational leaders to make sure these areas are well covered—well before any response. Once an agreement is in place and responses start, regular drills between the normally responding companies helps ensure that everyone knows how things will work on the scene.  

In Illinois, the MABAS (Mutual Aid Box Alarm System; mabas-il.org) has been around since the 60s. Those departments don't know how to behave any other way than through the collaborative efforts of MABAS. This fire in Tinley Park (MABAS Division 24) was just another example of the system working as it was designed. 

Ineffective or lacking scene communications and incompatible radio frequencies: MABAS has a radio coordination system so it is impossible for fire departments to NOT communicate with each other. The LODD incident referenced at the beginning of the article had several departments (from the same county and area) that were unable to communicate with one another—on one incident scene.

In this case, it is also important to note that as soon as firefighters discovered the hazard of the hole in the floor, that danger was announced and confirmed by all officers and crews operating. 

Crews failing to follow orders: Quite simply, that wasn't an issue here. There was no freelancing, no “doing what we want” and no lack of discipline on this fireground. It was a “routine” fire in the sense that it went as they had planned based upon cultural discipline coupled with clear tactical roles, tight command/control and accountability, both individually and operationally.  

Final thoughts

What went right at this fire in Tinley Park is due to the fact that they have requirements for training, policies, guidelines, discipline and a legacy of consistent leadership. They have a “way” of conducting business that everyone is trained on, locally and regionally. Couple that with the Village’s requirement for partial residential fire suppression, institutional mutual-aid culture related to the staffing, response, operations and the communications requirements of MABAS, and you end up with an increased and predictable shot at a positive outcome—an outcome that is justifiably expected for the citizens and the department’s members.

Sincere thanks to all who contributed to this article, as well as the members of the TPFD, the EMS crews and the departments that provided automatic or mutual aid.